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Abstract
This paper analyzes C6te d'Ivoire's  experience  with  tremendous improvement  in  sector performance.
telecommunications  liberalization  and privatization.  C6te  Between  1997 and  2001,  fixed-line telephone
d'lvoire  privatized  its incumbent  operator in  1997, and  penetration  grew from  1.03 to 1.80  per hundred people,
granted  the newly privatized  firm seven years of fixed-  while mobile  penetration skyrocketed  from 0.26  to 4.46.
line  exclusivity while introducing "managed  But  it is still  too early to assess the validity of granting
competition"  in the cellular market and free competition  exclusivity to the incumbent operator. While  penetration
in  value-added  services  (VAS).  By March 2001,  three  increased,  the operator  did not meet objectives regarding
cellular operators and a number of VAS providers  had  rural telephony  and service  quality. Moreover,  fixed-line
entered the market.  Reform has thus significantly  penetration increased  in areas where  the operator  faced
changed  the landscape  of C6te d'Ivoire's  competition  from mobile  providers.
telecommunications  sector and has brought with it
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Under the  pressure  of technological  progress  and of the  increasing  influence  of the
liberal  theories,  the telecommunication  sector  has been  in deep  mutation  in the  last twenty
years.  This transformation,  which started in 1984 with the divestiture of the monopoly ATT in
the  USA,  has  already  occurred  in  Japan,  Western  Europe  and  to  a  less  extent  in Eastern
Europe  (Czech Republic,  Slovak Republic,  Hungary)  and  in  some  LDCs  such as Argentina
and Mexico.  Africa has been left apart from this trend until  recently and where it has occurred
it was  often under  the pressure  of international  institutions  such  as the World  Bank and the
IMF.
C6te  d'Ivoire  has  followed  this  path  since  1991.  Indeed,  the  restructuring  of  the
telecommunications  sector  began  in  1991  by  the  financial  and  technical  diagnosis  of  the
public  operator as well as with the project  to update  the old signaling  code.  The coming into
force of this new code  in  1995  (Law  n°95-526  of July  07th,  1995)  has given  a boost  to  the
reforms and totally transformed  the Ivoirian telecommunications  space.  The final touch to the
restructuring was completed  by the grant of a twenty-year  concession for the fixed lines and a
51%  capital  offering  of the public  operator to  the company France  Cdbles et Radio after  an
international invitation to tender.
This  work  aims  at  analyzing  the  main  features  of the  reform  as  well  as  its  main
consequences.  First, we  will comment  on the  economic and political  factors  that gave rise  to
this reform. We will also draw a broad picture of the technical and financial state  of the public
operator  before  its  privatization.  Then,  we  will  analyze  several  aspects  of the  reforms
undertaken  trying  to  pin  down  not  only  its  results  but  also  the  problems  linked  with  its
implementation.
1-  ECONOMIC AND  POLITICAL CIRCONSTANCES  OF THE REFORMS
1.1-  The economic  and social environment
The history of Cote d'Ivoire  since independence  in  1960 is a  sequence of fast growing
periods  (65-75)  (83-86)  interrupted by external  shocks  on the  prices of coffee  and cacao.  In
particular  the  successful  adjustment period  of 1981-86  ran  into a collapse of the  coffee  and
cacao prices at the end of 1986 which sent back the country into crisis.
According  to the World Bank, the terims of trade went down by 18.2%  in  1987,  10.4%
in  1988,  13.7%  in 1989  and 7% in  1990. It represents  a fall of more than 41% between  1986
and  1990.  During those  years,  the  real  effective  exchange  rate  appreciated  by more  than  a
third because  of the drop  in the value  of the  dollar.  The GDP  fell in real terms  by 2.45  on
annual  average  between  1986  and  1990.  Taking  into  account  the  population  growth,  the
3annual average drop was of 5.2%  during the same period.  This represents a fall in revenue per
capita of 22.6%  in  four years.  In  1990,  C6te d'Ivoire  fell,  for the  first time,  in the  group  of
countries eligible for intemational  aid with a GNP per capita  slightly lower than 740 dollars.
At  the  beginning  of  the  crisis,  the  government  adopted  a  wait-and-see  policy,
suspending  the  debt  servicing  in  June  1987,  delaying  the  sale  of the  cocoa  crop  until  the
French  intervention  and  refusing  to  lower  the  coffee  and  cocoa  producers'  prices  until July
1989 when  a first  drop occurred,  followed by a second  in October  1989. In a crisis situation
such as the one Cote  d'Ivoire  suffered  from after 1986,  such a policy was unsustainable.  The
Agency for Stabilization  (CAISTAB) who had  a profit of 4.2%  of the GDP in  1986 turned to
be in deficit because of the stabilization operations of 1.9% of the GDP in  1987, 3.5%  in  1988
and 5.4% in  1989.  The stabilization of the cocoa price  was the operation that cost the most to
the CAISTAB with a maximum  of 4.2% in 1989.  The budget deficit, including  the interest on
the  national  debt,  constantly  increased  until  1989.  Figure  1 depicts  the  movement  of this
deficit until  1998.
Figure  1: Budget Deficit on a GDP Percentage  Basis.






Besides,  the amount of the budget deficit was estimated  at  11.2 billions  $ in  1990 and
the country was  listed by the World Bank among the 17 most indebted  countries in the world.
The  level  of its debt per capita  was  the highest in Africa.  Meanwhile,  the current  account of
the balance of payments was worsening and reached  a deficit of 10.5%  of GDP in 1990  (from
an equilibrium position in 1985).  Table  1 represents this series.
4Table 1: Current  Account  of the Balance  of Payments
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
% PIB  0.7  -3.7  -. 6  -9.8  -10.4  -10.5
Source: IMF
All in all, forced to give up his position of planters'  defense, lowering the producers'
prices  and  abandoning  the  project  to  support unilaterally  the  international  price  of cocoa,
President Houphouet  Boigny had also been weakened by the political  situation  of his country
and by the  actions  of the  intemational  institutions.  In particular,  he lost the collaboration  of
Antoine  Cesario,  the  soul  of the Direction et Controle des Grands Travaux (DCGTX,  now
called Bureau National d  'Etudes Techniques du Developpement (BNETD)),  who had been the
head  of the  presidential  committee  for economic  issues.  He  had  no  option  but  to  let  the
government  announce  the  drastic  austerity  measures  of  spring  1990,  including  a  wage
reduction in the public sector and enterprises.  From this period, the social unrest grew with an
unknown vigor in the history of the country.  On top of the traditional opponents, the students
and their teachers,  all the  other economic  and  social classes,  in particular the policemen  and
the soldiers,  contributed  to this unrest.  In order  to  save the  regime  and the country  close to
chaos, two important measures were decided.
First,  following  the  recommendation  of  the  international  institutions,  Alassane
Dramane  Ouattara,  the  governor  of the  West  African  States  Central  Bank  (BCEAO)  and
formerly IMF employee  was appointed  on April  18th,  1990, the head of the interdepartmental
board  of coordination,  responsible  for  implementing  a  new  program  of economic  revival
negotiated with the  IMF  and  the World Bank.  His first speeches  concerned  the <(suspension
of all the measures announced the latter days >>.  Secondly,  on April 30t,  1990, the politburo of
the  PDCI  (Parti Democratique de  C6te d'Ivoire) invited  the  government  to apply  the  7th
article of the Constitution concerning the integral multiparty system and on May  30th, 1990, 9
political parties were  legalized,  including the Front Populaire  Ivoirien (FPI) of the historian
Laurent  Gbagbo  and the Parti  Ivoirien des Travailleurs  (PIT) of the lawyer Francis  Wodie.
From then on, the social unrest diminished gradually until the general elections that reinforced
the power  of the  President and  of the  PDCI.  Indeed,  Houphouet  Boigny  was  reelected  on
th October  28  ,  1990, with 81.67% of the votes and the PDCI obtained  166 out of 175 seats at
the  National  Assembly.  Meanwhile,  the  position  of Alassane  Ouattara,  appointed  as Prime
Minister  in  November  1990,  was  reinforced  and  he  was  then  able  to  implement  his
stabilization plan with a certain room for manceuvre  and envisionned structural reforms.
Those internal  adjustments,  in spite  of the cost reduction and the restructuring  of the
coffee  and cocoa industry,  did not remedy  the increased  deterioration of the country terms of
trade whereas  the  exchange  rate did not really  improved.  Thus,  the production of the export
5crops  stagnated with the fall in the producers'  price. The secondary and tertiary sector activity
was  affected  by  the  contraction  of domestic  demand  resulting  in  a  wage  fall  and  some
difficulties  of the  financial  sector.  The  gross domestic  investment  remained  constant during
the period  1989-1993,  accounting  approximately  for 9%  of the  GDP,  whereas  the  domestic
saving fell to reach  10%  of the GDP, to be compared  to 28.4%  in  1985,  before the beginning
of the recession.  Besides,  the fiscal measures  did not compensate the  erosion of the taxation
basis  due  to  both  the  extension  of fraud  and  to  the  regular  contraction  of  GDP.  The
administrative  reforms  did  not  result  in  any  increase  in  the  amount  of taxes  collected.
Similarly,  although  the  public  sector  wage  bill  decreased  of about  5.5%  in nominal  value
between  1989 and 1993,  it represented then 75% of the fiscal revenues  in 1993  against 56% in
1989.
As a  consequence,  in spite of the  initial reduction of the primary budget deficit  from
7.8%  of  the  GDP  in  1989  to  1.4%  in  1992,  the  scheduled  primary  surpluses  were  not
obtained.  The  budgetary  constraints,  which  had worsened  in  1993,  prevented  an  important
rationalization  of the  fiscal  system  and  of the  incentive  structures.  The  mass  of domestic
overdue and the considerable  extemal debt hampered  the return of the investors'  confidence.
Thus,  it  clearly  appeared  that,  without  any  deep  rearrangement  of the  adjustment
strategy, based  so far exclusively on intemal measures,  it would be difficult for Cote d'Ivoire
to  improve  the  financial  and  economic  situation  and  obtain  the  necessary  means  to
compensate  the  lack  of domestic  savings.  Houphouet  Boigny,  the  fiercest  opponent  of the
CFA  franc  devaluation  died  on  December  7th,  1993  and  was  replaced,  by  virtue  of the
constitution,  by  the more  liberal  Henri  Konan  Bedie.  Alassane  Dramane  Ouattara  resigned
and  his  ministry  for  finance  and  economics,  Daniel  Kablan  Duncan,  took  his  position  as
Prime Minister.  Consequently,  C6te d'Ivoire accepted the inclusion of the modification of the
CFA  franc  parity  in  its  structural  adjustment  policy,  in cooperation  with its partners  of the
Franc  area all more or less subject to the same difficulties.  It was fixed at 100 CFA francs for
th 1 French franc from January  12  , 1994, representing a 50% reduction  of the CFA franc value.
During  1994, the Ivoirian  economy reacted  in a positive way to the redirecting  of the
relative  prices  and  to  the  large  improvement  of  the  productive  sector  competitiveness,
consequence  of the CFA franc devaluation.  In spite  of the  fall in the real disposable income,
the  GDP  rose  by  1.7%  while  it  had  fallen  of 0.8%  in  1993.  Finally,  the  austerity  of the
budgetary policy of 1994 played  a large part in this general  improvement.  The redirecting  of
the fiscal policy, the strict control of public  spending and the reduction of the interest arrears
jointly contributed  to the  positive  reaction of the  economy to the parity  change.  The public
finance policy in  1995  and after was to consolidate this progress. From  1995,  the govemment
committed  himself to  deepen  its  structural  reforms  program  in  order  to  make  the  national
economy more competitive, through the focus of the State activities on regulation,  control and
security.  Thus,  some large reforms were decided on the telecommunications  sector leading to
6the  introduction  of competition  for the cellular  and  the privatization  of the fixed  telephony
firm in 1997.
1.2-  The privatization movement
The  first privatization  which took place  was in the  electric  sector.  The public  firm
(Energie  Electrique  de  Cote  d'Ivoire  (EECI))  which  was  a monopoly  was in  a situation  of
bankruptcy.  Privatization  of this vital  sector  was decided  in urgency  leaving no  time  to the
public,  the  workers  or  the parlement  to  react.  Decided  in August  1990,  an  agreement  was
reached with BOUYGUES without any serious study on the sole argument that BOUYGUES
was running satisfactorily the water sector  since the sixties.  In November  1990, BOUYGUES
created the Compagnie Ivoirienne  d'Electricite.
The frustrations caused by this decision convinced the leaders that privatization  should
be planned  on  the basis  of serious  economic  studies.  This led to the  creation  in December
1990  of  the  Comite  de  Privatisation.  Its  first  major  operation  was  the  privatization  of
telecommunications.
The  Comite  de  Privatisation  established  a  strategic  approach  to  the  privatization  of
telecommunications  with the following steps:
1991:Determination of the method for elaborating  the strategic objectives  of the sector at the
horizon 2000.
1991-1995:  Elaboration of a consensus over strategic  objectives.  The need to convince  the
workers  and members of the parlement  opposed to the privatization of a strategic sector
explains  the  length  of  the  process.  Some  members  of the  Comite  de  Privatisation
evangelized  the benefits of privatization  for several years.  Some opposition  came  also
from the fact that at the time  of nationalizations  in the sixties,  it was claimed that these
nationalized firms would be sold back later to Ivoirians and not foreigners  . Workers in
the telecommunications  industry were rather easily convinced by:
*  the  perspective  of private  sector  wages  which  were  at  the  time  much
higher than in the public sector,
*  the argument that the  sector would strongly  develop  and that there  was no
risk for their employment,
*  the settlement reached about pension funds.
The  accession  to  power  of  Konan  Bedie  after  the  death  of  Houphouet  Boigny
accelerated  the process.  Indeed, K.  Bedie was before the head of the Parlement and was
opposed  to privatization  because  of the  lack  of a proper  law  providing  a  transparent
framework.  As soon  as he became  President the loi d'habitation  des privatisations  was
passed and this settled that issue.
71995:Adoption  of  strategic  objectives  and  of  the  approach  to  privatization.  The  major
conclusion  of that work  was the recognition  of the need  to  find a balance  between  the
imperative  of  attracting  capital  with  monopolistic  restrictions  and  the  need  for
competition to achieve efficiency.
July 7, 1995:  Adoption of the new Code des Telecommunications.
July 19,  1995:Creation  of the  regulatory bodies  (Agences  des Tel6communications,  Conseil
des  T6l6communications).  Quite  wisely,  regulatory  institutions  were  designed  well  in
advance  of  privatization,  unfortunately  not  without  some  confusions  about
responsabilities  (see below).
February 1997:  Privatization.
2-  FEATURES  OF THE  SECTOR BEFORE THE REFORMS
2.1-  The evolution  of the sector
Just  after  the  independence,  the  supervision  of the  postal  and  telecommunication
services of C6te d'Ivoire was shared by several  administrations but the revenues were directed
to the general budget.  In  1965,  the postal and telecommunication  administration  was created
under the  form of a public utility of administrative  nature,  with its own  budget.  In  1969, the
Societe  des  Telecommunications Internationales de  C6te d'Ivoire (INTELCI,  the  national
company  for  intemational  telecommunications)  was  created  (Decree  n°69-70  of February
24th  1969),  under the structure of a goverment-controlled  corporation,  with a State majority
share-holding  of 52%  of the  500  millions of CFA francs  of nominal  capital  and 48%  for the
Company France  Cable Radio. C6te d'Ivoire then carried out the privatization  of intemational
telecommunications  which  represented  60%  of the  revenues  of CI-TELCOM  in  1996.  The
company INTELCI was the owner of the infrastructures it used.  In 1975,  the Office des Postes
et  Telecommunications (OPT,  Post  and  Telecommunication  Office)  was  created  with  two
autonomous  offices,  the Direction Generale des Telcommunications (DGT, General  Office
of Telecommunications)  and  the Direction Generale des Postes (DGP,  General  Post Office).
The  1976 telecommunications  code granted  the  State monopoly  to  the OPT,  for the  national
and the  international  services.  The State's  share  in INTELCI  capital was then brought  up to
80%  after  the  capital  had  increased  to  2  billions  of  CFA  francs.  In  1981,  INTELCI  was
transformed  in a public  firm with a State share  holding of 100%.  Following the  1984 breakup
of the  OPT  into two  offices,  respectively  in charge  of the  postal  services  (ONP)  and of the
8telecommunications  (ONT),  the company INTELCI  was dissolved.  Its activities and those of
the  DGT were  put under the  authority of the ONT,  set up under the  form of a State-Owned
Enterprise  of Industrial  and Commercial  Nature (Etablissement Public a caractere  Industriel
et Commercial (EPIC))  in  application  of the  decree  n°86-1129  of October  08th,  1986.  The
same decree gave the Ministry the responsibility  for the elaboration  and implementation of the
policy of the post and telecommunication  public services policy and regulation.  It had also the
responsibility  for the functioning  of these services  throughout the public  bodies put under  its
administrative  and technical  control (in particular, the ONT).
Up to  1991,  this State-owned  Company (ONT)  had managed,  on behalf of the  State,
the  monopoly  of all  the  telecommunication  sector  except  radio  and  television.  Since  1991,
some new  objectives  were  defined  by the  government  for this sector.  The pursuit of these
objectives  led  to  the  questioning  of  the  absolute  monopoly  of  the  ONT  on  the
telecommunication  services  and to the redefinition  of the Ministry's  mission.  Indeed,  on the
nd one  hand,  the  decree  n°91-72  of February  2n  ,  1991  on the  organization  of the  Ministry  of
Post  and Telecommunications,  created  within  this  Ministry  some  regulation  and  technical
control bodies namely:
*  the  Office  for  General  Regulation  (Direction de  la  Reglementation
Generale)
*  the Office  for Planning and Development (Direction de la Planification  et
du Developpement)
*  the General Inspectorate (Inspection Generale).
On the other hand, the restructuring  scheme of the telecommunication  sector  adopted
on March  6th,  1991, chose for the management of telecommunication  services and networks:
*  A  government-controlled  corporation  with  the  structure  of  a  limited
company for the services  linked with the State monopoly.  So,  on May  14th
1991,  the  Ivoirian  Telecommunications  Company  (CI-TELCOM)  was
created,  according  to  the  common  law,  with,  in  a  transitory  phase,  a
nominal capital of 4 billions francs, 98% owned by the State and 2% by the
staff.  CI-TELCOM  took  over  the  ONT  whose  new  missions  were
redefined.
9*  Some  private  companies for operating  the  services open  to competition  in
association  or  competition  with  CI-TELCOM.  Those  companies  were
granted an operating license.
*  The  temporary  survival  of the ONT with  for its main missions  the control
of the management made by CI-TELCOM of its assets.
*  The updating  of the legal  framework  aiming essentially  at completing  and
adapting  all  the  regulatory  and  legislative  acts  dealing  with  this  sector  in
Cote d'Ivoire to the new area of telecommunication.
Thus,  the liberalization  of telecommunication  services  supply, apart from the reserved
services,  and  the  separation  of  the  regulatory  task  from  the  operation  of the  networks
generated  a new  structure  for the telecommunication  space  in  CMte  d'Ivoire.  Before  dealing
with  this reform strictly  speaking,  let us draw  a broad picture of the  technical  and  financial
situation of the telecommunication  sector in 1996.
2.2-  The situation and the main problems
2.2.1.  The bad technical results of CI-TELCOM
The  telecommunication  and  information  processing  infrastructures  are  made  up  of
telephone  infrastructures  (switching  exchanges,  subscribers  network,  local,  long-distance  and
intemational  connections), broadcasting and computing  infrastructures.  The  services provided
by the communication  networks are:  telephony,  telex, telegraph,  data transmission,  television
and  radio.  This  brief  summary  enables  to  look  upon  the  limits  and  problems  of  this
infrastructure.  3
The equipment decay.
The grid of the CI-TELCOM  network for national transmissions,  organized  in primary
and secondary channels,  is rather weak.  It is numerical  for 59% and analog for 41%. The main
transmission media used by this network are:
*  2.494 km of analog radio links;
2C6te  d'lvoire Telecom:  DPPE Office  for Planning and Equipment Programming (conclusions  of the commission
"Infrastructures"  October  1996).
10*  3.085 km of digital radio links;
*  545 km of optic fiber cables.
The radio links represent 90% of the national  transmission and the fiber optics 9%.
The network of international  transmissions is made of:
*  One land station  located at Akakro, with 3 antennas  oriented towards  some
geostationary  satellites.
*  Two  systems  of  submarine  cables  called  FRATERNITE  linking  Cote
d'Ivoire  to  Senegal  and  UNION  linking  CMte  d'Ivoire  to  Nigeria  out  of
order since July 1995.
*  Two telephone  exchanges of international  transit,  one digital  and the other
analog.
*  One exchange of telegraphic  and telex switching.
*  Two centers of exploitation.
This international  network  has 4.300 circuits of which  950 are exploited  (hence a use
rate  of 22%).  One  must  observe  that  the  digitization  rate  of these  circuits  is  40%.  The
intemational  transmission use three main supports:
*  Satellite,  with a use rate of 82% and a digitization rate of 37%
*  Submarine  Cables, totally analog with a use rate of 36%
*  International  electromagnetic  waves  which  cover  for  98%  the  domestic
needs and for 2% the intemational  needs.
The  analog transmission  channels  analyzed  above  are  between  11  and  26 years  old
whereas  the life expectancy  is about  15 years.  As far as the numerical  transmission  channels
are concemed,  they are  obsolete and unsafe.  Some  urban networks,  built 15  or even 20 years
ago, have not been significantly updated since whereas  the average life expectation  of a cable
is 10 years. The decay of these networks has a negative influence on the quality of the service.
As far as Switching  is concemed, the total  number of subscribers  amounts to  152 449
spread out among  114 telephone exchanges with:
*  43 analog telephone exchanges
*  50 digital telephone exchanges
*  21  annual commutators
11The  analog telephone  exchanges  located inside  the country are  obsolete  leading to most
of the  communication  breakdowns.  As  for  the  digital  telephone  exchanges  of Bouake  and
Yopougon brought into service in the eighties, they mainly suffer from a shortage of supply in
spare parts that are not produced  any more.
Lack  of optics fiber  in  the  transmission network.  It  only  represent  9%  of  the
transmission.  This proportion was very small  in the perspective of the information highways.
Insuffjicient maintenance. The  maintenance  plan had been perturbed by  a shortage  in
spare  parts.  The  delivery  delays are very  high.  Moreover,  there is  a total  lack of preventive
maintenance  in data networks.
Network engineering. The  growth of the telephone  infrastructures is not in phase  with
the  fast urbanization  and  the  plans  of development  of social  equipment  (housing,  school,
plumbing facilities,)  in the urban  areas.  This situation has sometimes  induced Cote d'Ivoire to
connect some new subscribers  without taking  into account the engineering rules.
Unsatisfied  demand.  In December  1995, there are  56 000 demands pending.  One must
also  add  the unexpressed  demands.  Indeed,  taking into account the  average  delay of 3  years
for connection, some people do not express a demand any more.
Low accessibility
Weak  telephone density.  The  computation  of the  telephone  density,  defined  by  the
number  of  main  lines  for  100  inhabitants,  provides  a  technical  index  of  the  network
development  which,  compared  to  Africa  or  to  the  Developed  Countries,  was  very  low.  In
Figure  2  below,  one  can  observe  that,  although  it  is  higher  than  the  index of Subsaharan
Africa,  it remains smaller than 1 (or  10 for  1000 inhabitants).
12Figure 2:  Number of Lines Per 1000 Inhabitants
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Unequal regional  distribution. In 1995,  almost  75% of the lines  are in the economic
capital (Abidjan). Figure 3 shows the existing investment  distortions between Abidjan and the
rest of the country.
Figure 3: Regional  Distribution of Telephones  in cote d'Ivoire (1995)
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Small number of call boxes.  The number of call boxes  is another important index of
accessibility.  It is all  the more important  in a country like  CMte  d'Ivoire that, as observed  by
the ITU, call boxes are used a lot in the countries with a low telephone equipment rate (Report
on the  world  telecommunications  development,  1998,  ITU).  Before  the reforms,  there were
13almost no call boxes.  There  were only a  few (174, installed  in 1994)  in Abidjan,  Bouake and
Yamoussoukro.  In  1996, the year before the license was granted,  there were  277 call boxes  in
C6te d'Ivoire,  representing  only 0.019  for  1000  inhabitants.  Using the  database  of the  ITU,
one can compare  this number with the world average  (based on 43 countries) for 1996.
Table 2: Number of call  boxes for 1000 inhabitants in 1996
C6te d'lvoire  African Average  World Average
0.019  0.29  1.79
Source: Computations  made  using the  ITU database.
Table 2 reveals that the call boxes rate in Cote d'Ivoire is really low,  even one of the
lowest of the African countries and of the world.
Low productivity
The productivity  indicator,  defined  by  the number  of agents  for  1000  main lines,  is
quite  bad  for the  African  operators  of the  telecommunication  sector,  in particular  for  CI-
Telcom.  In 1994,  the productivity index in Cote d'Ivoire  was 36.12.  Even if it was lower than
the  one  of the  sub-Saharan  countries,  it  was  quite  high  compared  with  the  African  or  the
average of the developed countries (see Figure 4). Two factors  can explain this bad result.  The
hiring had been made for long on social or political bases, the operator being under the control
of the Government.  The delay in the introduction of new technologies using fewer workforces
had also been a negative factor.
Table 3: Number of Employees  per 1000  Inhabitants (1994)
America  Asia  Europe  Africa  Northern  Southem  IC  SSA
Africa  Africa  Africa
5.08  11.94  7.65  22.63  19.43  15.29  36.12  40.99
Source:  Cl-Telecom (DPPE:  Office for Planning and Equipment Programming)
14Figure 4: Number of Employees  per 1000 Inhabitants (1994)
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Investment Cost per line
The  investment  cost per line  is quite  high,  mainly  due  to poor  investment planning,
high equipment  and  some execution  delays.  This cost estimated  to 3567$ in  1994 was below
the  African  average,  (5600$),  but greatly  above  the  one  of the  developed  countries,  1500$
(ITU  1996).
Quality of the service
The volume of the Ivoirian telecommunication  infrastructures  is the highest of the sub-
region after the one of Nigeria. Nevertheless,  its growth rate (10%  between  1984 and 1994)  is
lower than the ones of Senegal  (13%) and Burkina Faso (11,9%).
Moreover,  CI-Telcom  has  one  of the  highest failure  rates (88%  in  1994 and  75%  in
1995) for an objective of 3% for the ITU. This high failure rate is explained by the poor state
of the telecommunication  network.  The subscribers'  connecting  delay,  which is about 3 years
and a  half, is quite high even compared with the ones of Benin (2 years and a half) and Togo
(2  years).  This long connection  delay  can be explained  by the stock outage,  the network and
switching  exchanges  saturation.  As  for  the  efficiency  rate,  it  remains  low  (<40%  for  the
national, <70% for the local). A look at the Table 4 and 5 below allows a comparison between
some quality indices.
15Table 4: Service  Quality Indicators (1994)
Country  Number  of ML  Number of ML  Growth  rate  Failure  rate  Average  Connecting
in 1984  in 1994  Delay (years)
Benin  10 600  19 300  6.17%  90%  2.4
Burkina Faso  7 800  24 100  11.90%  88%
Cote d'lvoire  51 700  103 268  10%  80%  3.7
Ghana  38  100  58 500  4.3%  176%  >  10
Mauritania  3 800  8 400  8.25%  206%  4.4
Nigeria  192 600  368 700  6.7.0%  327%  1.2
Niger  7 900  10 500  2.90%  78.90%  3.3
Senegal  21  100  72000  13%  39.40%  1.2
Togo  8 400  21 400  9.8%  20%  2
South Africa  2  153  000  3 884 500  6%  - 1
Tunisia  168 800  474  300  10.90%  92%  2.8
Morocco  215 400  992  800  17%  67%  0.7
Source:  Cl Telcom (DPPE:  Office for Planning  and Equipment Programming)
Table 5: Indicators of the quality of the service  (1995)
Indicators  Observed  values  for  Observed  values  for  Typical  European  ITU
Cote d'Ivoire  Africa  values
Efficiency  rate  of  automatic
calls
Local  50 - 70%  50 - 70%  60 - 70%  > 70%
National  27 - 40%  20 - 25%  55 - 65%  > 60%
International  53 - 56%  20 - 30%  35 - 40%
Dialing tone delay  > 90%  < 80%  99%
% of calls  with  a dialing  tone
obtained  in 3 seconds
International  Efficiency  rate  of
automatic calls
In  I hour  40%  80%
In 2 hours  60%  90%
Global  70%  95%
Operators reply delay
% of calls with a reply in  10 sec.
Non available  90%
Number of failures  per  year per  0.8  1.4 - 6  0.25 - 0.5
lines
Speed of replacement  in case of
failure
% replaced the same  day  10 - 35%  70 - 90%
% replaced day D+l  30 - 56%  40 - 60%  80%
% replaced  in 7 days  76 - 92%  60 - 80%  99%
% replaced  in 30 days  >95%  Non available  100%
Source:  Cl Telcom (DPPE: Office for Planning and Equipment Programming)
162.2.2.  The bad financial results of CI-Telcom
The bad state of the CI-Telcom  financial  indicators is another  factor that promoted the
advent of the reforms and the privatization of this firm. Indeed, some bills were not paid. The
collection rate was very low, about 65% in 1996.
The operating cost per line amounted  to 528422  CFA (927  $)  in 1995,  well above the
average cost of 380$ according to the computation  of the ITU.
The  poor operating result  of CI-Telcom  was also  one  of the main reasons leading  to
the decision of a concession to a private  operator. In 1994, the firm suffered from a net loss of
4.8  billions  CFA  francs,  partly  due  to the  CFA  franc  devaluation.  The  same  year,  the  net
worth  was  very  low  (64  888)  as  well  as  the  turnover.  Table  6  sums  up  those  financial
indicators before the privatization.
Table 6: Financial results of CI-Telcom  before privatization
(in millions of f CFA)  1994  1995  1996
Losses and Profits
Turnover  62 429  95 223  85 229
Net result  -4 848  4 562  350
Net result / Turn over  -7.8%  4.79%  0.4%
Balance  sheet
Fixed assets  128 658  131  488  135 731
Working capital  63  158  71 676  62  363
Net worth (1)  64 888  69 352  69 305
Long  term  Liabilities  40 349  56 007  48 211
(2)
Current Liabilities  86  579  77 805  80 578
Profitability (3)  - 7.47%  6.58%  0.51%
Debt ratio (4)  38.34%  44.68%  41.03%
Bills collection  Rate  __165%
Source:  Cl Telcom (Financial  reports  1994,  1995  and  1996)
(1)  Net worth = Net worth + exceptional  funds + Net result - unaffected  losses.
(2)  Long term  Liabilities = Long term  Liabilities + provisions
(3)  Profitability = Net result / Net worth
(4)  Debt ratio = Debts / Debts + Net worth
3-  THE RESTRUCTURING  OF THE SECTOR
The  liberalization  policy  was  initiated  by  the  introduction  of  a  new
telecommunications  code  in  order  to  encourage  private  operators  while  maintaining  the
prerogative  of  the  authorities  on  the  telecommunications  sector.  In  order  to  promote
performance,  competition was extended to all the services but the telephone  services between
fixed points and the telex that have remained a monopoly.
173.1-  The new legal and institutional framework
Indeed,  the law N° 95-526  of July 7h,  1995 conceming the telecommunications  code
established  a new  legal  code  and  as  well  as  a  new  regulatory  framework.  The  legal  code
provided for three possible regimes according to the type of activity.
The regime  of State's Exclusive  Rights,  with  the possibility of concession  of all  or part of
those rights to one or several natural persons or legal entities. This regime included:
*  The construction of public telecommunication networks,  with the exception
of the radio networks.
*  The provision of telephone  services between fixed points.
*  The provision of the telex.
To work  in those fields,  the  firms concerned  must be  granted a concession  signed by
the State.
The  regime of regulated competition  or of  permit.  The  activities concerned  by this regime
are:
*  The  building and  operating  of radio  networks  as well  as  the provision  of
radio services.
*  The construction of private networks.
*  The provision of support services.
To  work  in  those  fields,  the  firms  concerned  must  be  granted  some  authorizations
delivered by the Telecommunication  Agency of CMte d'Ivoire (see below).
The regime of open competition.  The activities submitted to this regime are:
*  The internal networks
*  The  independent  networks  others  than  radio  networks  such that  the ending
points are  distant from one another by less than 300 meters  and such that the
connecting capacity is less than 2.1 megabits per second.
*  The  radio  installation  exclusively  made  of  low  power  and  small  range
equipments.
*  The sale of approved terminal equipments.
18The  institutional framework  was organized as follow:  The responsibilities  allocated to
the  government  through  the  Office  of  Policy  and  International  Affairs  for  Post  and
Telecommunications  (Direction des  Politiques et  Affaires  Internationales des  Postes  et
Telcommunications, DPAI - PT) are:
*  To define the policies,  to design and propose the  laws it judges the best to
fill the telecommunications  needs;
*  To propose  the  orientation,  the  directing  principles  and the objectives  to
promote  a dynamic  and balanced  development  of the telecommunications
sector;
*  To  ensure  an adequate  representation  in line  with the  priorities  of C6te
d'Ivoire  inside the national and international  bodies and institutions;
*  To  define  the norms and  the technical  specifications  to be  applied in C6te
d'Ivoire,  in accordance  with the relevant national  and  international  bodies
in this matter;
*  To  check  that,  on the  one  hand,  the  regulation  functions  and  the  control
activities of this  sector, and on the other hand, the network  operating or the
telecommunications  services  provisions  functions  are  made  in  a
independent manner.
The  regulatory  institutions of this sector are the Telecommunication  Agency  of CMte
d'Ivoire  (ATCI) and the Telecommunication Council of CMte d'Ivoire  (CTCI).
The  responsibilities  of ATCI,  whose mission  consists in exercising  the  attributions,
rights and obligations devolved to the Civil  Service by the telecommunications  code, are:
*  To enforce the regulatory acts as far as telecommunications  are concerned;
*  To define pricing and to authorize prices of principles  for services provided
under the monopoly regime;
*  To deliver the operating authorization of the telecommunication  services;
*  To grant the consent of the terminal equipments;
*  To take care of the monitoring and to follow the use of the radio frequency
spectrum through;
*  To play a part in exercising  the State missions  as far as defense  and public
safety are concerned;
19*  To  play  a  part  in  exercising  any  other  public  mission  in  the
telecommunications  sector that the government  could entrust him  with  on
behalf of the State.
The  Agency  is  submitted  to  the administrative  supervision  of the  telecommunication
and  civil  service  ministries,  to  the  technical  supervision  of the  telecommunication  Ministry
and to the economic  and financial  supervision of the finance Ministry. A nine-member board,
chosen  for their renown  and  competence  in  the telecommunications  area manages  it.  Their
positions are incompatible with having an activity in the telecommunication  sector or holding
some  financial position  in a  firm of this  sector.  The agency  checks the implementation  of the
government policy in the sector. To that end, it takes all the relevant decisions in the operating
and  managing areas.  Public  Utility with  a  special  status  when  created,  the  ATCI became  a
State-owned Enterprise November  11 th,  1998.
Moreover part of the resources  devoted  to ATCI  are intended to the supervision  and
the  enforcement  control of the  concession agreement  of CI-Telcom  and of the authorization
clauses  of the mobiles and call  boxes operators,  to control the antagonistic  relations between
CI-Telcom  and the  other operators  (for example  the drafting of an interconnection  contract),
to carry out technical  researches and to maintain a sector-related database.
The CTCI, high independent authority,  is commissioned:
*  To watch  over the  respect of the equality principle  in  the treatment  of the
telecommunications  sector operators;
*  To watch over the respect of the stipulations of the concession  agreements,
of the specifications  and of the authorizations  granted by the Civil Service;
*  Before  any legal appeal,  to deal with the conciliation  and the arbitration  of
the  disputes  between  the  Civil  Service  and  the  operators  regarding  the
exercising of the administrative  attributes.
To carry  out those missions, the CTCI can:
*  Collect  (directly  or  indirectly)  from  the  Civil  Service,  the
telecommunication  companies  or  the  concessionaires  all  the  technical,
administrative  or financial information related to the investment programs;
*  Investigate  or ask  any  specialized  body  to  investigate  the  concessionaires
and the other telecommunications  companies.
20The CTCI is made  up seven members of whom one president.  Those personalities  are
chosen for their experience,  their interest in telecommunications  and their integrity.  They are
appointed  by  decree  for  a  five-year  term.  Their  position  is  compatible  with  exercising  a
professional activity.  Nevertheless,  the CTCI members are not allowed to have an activity or
to hold some financial positions in a firm of the  telecommunication  sector.
The Council meets as often as necessary.  Its deliberations  are legitimate only if at least
five  members  are  present.  Those  deliberations  are  ratified  with  a  majority  of four  of the
attending  members.  The  Council  informs  the authorities  of any assessed breach  of the legal
and regulation stipulations regarding the duties included in the concession agreement.
The  CTCI  has  already  intervened  in  a  series  of conflicts,  notably  on  the questions
related to the final  granting of the Publicom licence, to the authorization of subcontractors  for
CI-Telcom,  to the payment  made to the rural development funds and to the conflicts  between
the call boxes operating companies and  CI-Telcom concerning the granting of new telephone
lines.  We will  comment  on some of these  conflicts  in the  section  devoted to the regulatory
problems.
The third level of supervision of the telecommunications  sector includes the operators
who  are all private  or with a private majority shareholder for the main operator managing the
basic  services.  Those  operators  can  operate  all  the  networks  and  services  belonging  to the
competitive  sector,  notably  the  cellular  networks  (we  will  come  back  to  this point  in the
paragraph  devoted to the market structure).
3.2-  The privatization of the public operator
The  privatization  process  of the  telecommunications  sector,  which  started  in  1991
under the pressure of the World Bank and of some investors,  was part of a large privatization
program of about fifty enterprises.  In the light of the importance of telecommunications  in the
Ivoirian economy,  the  implementation  of the privatization  required  the  preparation  and  the
execution  of some  key  stages  necessary  for the  success  of the  operation.  The  Privatization
Committee,  jointly  with  the  Ministry  of  Telecommunications,  CI-Telcom,  the
Telecommunications  Agency  and  the  Office  for  Supervision  of Public  Works  (DCGTX),
prepared a schedule'of actions prior to the privatization.
The  first stage consisted in making a technical  and financial audit of CI-TELCOM  in
1991.  This  diagnosis  was  necessary  to  assess  the  investment  program  execution  of the
company, the state of repair of its technical infrastructures and its financial situation.
21The  second  stage,  started  in  1992,  concerned  the  review  of the  legal  and regulatory
framework  of the  sector  in  order  to  match  the  liberalization  objectives  and  the  private
operators' intervention  in the operating and financing of the telecommunication  activities.  The
review led to the passing of the telecommunications  code in July 1995 (Law n°95-526 of July
7th,  1995).  This  code  has  reorganized  the  telecommunications  sector  differentiating  the
function linked to the policy definition (exercised by the Ministry  of telecommunications),  the
regulatory  activities (carried  out by the Telecommunication  Agency  of Cote  d'Ivoire  and the
Telecommunication  Council  of Cote d'Ivoire)  and the networks operating  function exercised
by CI-TELCOM  and the cellular networks operators.
In  the third  stage,  the privatization  strategy  for CI-TELCOM  was defined.  The plan
chosen by the government  in  1995 consisted  in privatizing  the public  operator by integrating
the assets and the operating tasks  in order to maximize the telecommunications  efficiency  and
productivity.  Moreover, to speed up the network development,  the exclusivity period between
7 and 10 years has been granted to the network operator.  It was also planned to sell 51 to 55%
of the capital,  to keep a  State share holding of 35%, to give  I to 2% to the employees and the
rest through the Abidjan Stock Exchange.4
The pricing  of the  firm  financial  value  by an  international  and  independent  auditor,
Deloite et Touch,  was the  fourth stage.  The pricing  took into  account the  financial  situation
but,  most of all,  the  significant  growth  potential  of the  number of telephone  lines in  Cote
d'Ivoire.
The fifth stage of the process  was the definition of a pricing policy framework  for the
telecommunication  services.  Moreover,  a  project  of Concession  Agreement  defining  the
reciprocal  commitment  and  responsibilities  between  the  State  and  the  future  buyer  was
adopted.  The last stage of this long process consisted in choosing a merchant bank, Rothshild
and Cie Bank, to set up the transaction.
The  privatization  entered  into  the  final  stage  in  June  1996  with  the  competitive
international  invitation to tender. To avoid endless talks after the privatization,  the concession
agreement  already  written and  on  a  take-it-or-leave-it  basis  was  included  in  the application
form.  Each bidder had to sign each page.  Moreover,  the invitation to tender required that the
applicants  first be a renowned telecommunication  operator (or part of a  consortium with one
operator of that kind)  and second have the sufficient  financing capacity to face  the important
financial  needs.  Besides,  the  invitation  planned  a  two-round  auction;  the  first  aimed  at
4 Given then difficulties of the stock market the sale to the public never occured.
22preselecting  and  the second  for the  final offers.  At each  round,  the bidders  could make  two
bids  depending  on their wish to benefit or not from the investment code which provided for
tax exemptions on the equipment  imports for any investment above 500 millions CFA francs.
They had also to submit a restructuring and firing plan for the firm's employees and accept the
responsibility for the debt of 69 billions CFA francs.
Eight application  forms were  asked but only four applicants  were present at the first
round:
- Africa  Bell in a consortium with Atlantic  Telecom  Network  (ATN)  and TCI
with the technical help of ATT
- France Cables et Radio
- Telekom Malaysia
- Georges Sankara Holdings (GS  Holding)  in association with Bell Canada.
The  first  round  occurred  on  September  13th,  1996  and  table  7  below  shows  the
different bids.
Table 7: first round bids
ids in billions CFA  Bids without the code benefit  Bids with the code benefit
Operator
GS Holding  36.6  58.7
FCR  43  51
Africa Bell  70  125
Telekom Malaysia  92  No offer
Source:  Privatization  Committee
As it can be seen, the GS Holding's  bid was low but, most of all,  it  had not been  able
to prove  its alliance with Bell Canada.  It was excluded while the three  others could compete
in a second round.  That round took place  between the  14th and the 25th of November  1996.
Table  8 above  depicts  the  bids with the code  benefit  since  this  condition  was  imposed  to
simplify the auction.
Table 8: second  round bids
Bids in billions CFA  Bids with the code benefit
Operators
FCR  103
Africa Bell  106.3
Telekom Malaysia  82.4
Source: Privatization Committee
23Africa  Bell  was  then  present without  the  ATN  and  TCI  operators  but  still with  the
technical help of ATT.  It was given a one-week delay to include ATT in the core shareholders
and to give a banking  guarantee.  As it had not been able to do it, it was eliminated  in spite of
the fact that he made the best bid.
Since each bidder  still in competition  had  some problems  and since none of the bids
was  considered  as  satisfactory  in  view  of  the  government's  objective,  the  Privatization
Committee  decided to set up a third and last round. This  last round  occurred from December
th  t~~~~~~~h 20th,  1996 to January 8t,  1997 and FCR won with a 105  billions CFA bid to 104 billions CFA
rd for  Telekom  Malaysia.  The  Concession  agreement  was  signed  on  February  3  ,  1997,  at
Abidjan with the payment of the bid by check.
3.3-  The new structure of the telecommunications  market
Before  the  1995  Law,  only  the public  operator  (with  98%  of the  shares  hold by  the
State and 2% by the employees) was active  on the market.  Since the coming into force of this
law,  the market structure  has changed considerably.  It now includes  the following participants
(see Table  9):
- C6te d'Ivoire Telecom, the operator of the telegraphic  network,
- Three mobile operators:  Ivoiris,  Telecel de Loteny  and Comstar,
- Two voice mail operators:  Globe Access and Intelec Peyrissac,
- Three call boxes operators:  Publicom, Camitel and Sogequip,
- Ten  Internet  providers:  Africa  Online,  Access  Telecom,  Aviso,  Afnet,
NetAfric, Africa Connexion,  Africom, Comafrique, GSAM and Publicom.
24Table 9: market structure
Services  with value added  Telephone
Call boxes:
Voice-mail  Internet;  Publicom
Globe Access,  Sogequip
services  Africa Online,  Camitel*  Local
Access  NetAfric,
Intelec  Afnet,
Aviso,  Cellular  Telecel
Publicom*,  Telephony  Comstar  Long-distance
Data  GSAM*,  Ivoris
transmission;  Prestige*
Comafrique*
Several firms  Africom*  Fixed  linesI: Cl-Telecom
*Firms with an authorization but non opera ting
Although  they  all  belong  to  some  private  operators,  with  the  exception  of  C6te
d'lvoire  Telecom,  there  are  some  cross-shareholdings.  The  Internet  provider  Aviso  is  a
subsidiary of C6te d'Ivoire Telecom  whereas  one of the mobile  operators,  Ivoiris,  is held for
70% by France  Telecom which, through its subsidiaries,  holds 51% of CMte d'Ivoire Telecom.
According  to  the  legal  framework,  there  are  three  regimes  corresponding  to  the
different forms of participation in the sector.
The  main telecommunications operator (MTO),  the company  C6te d'Ivoire Telecom,
operates under the regime of Exclusive  Rights. It is a company of Ivoirian law with a nominal
capital of 15  billions CFA  francs held  for 51%  by the company France Cables  et Radio,  for
47%  by  the  State5 and  2%  by  the  employees.  To  reach  its  strategic  objectives  in  the
telecommunications  field,  the  State  has  granted  Cote  d'Ivoire  Telecom  a  concession  of
Exclusive Rights for twenty years from February 3rd,  1997.
During the first five years of the concession,  Cote d'Ivoire Telecom  is bound to carry
out some works to extend the geographic  cover, to develop the network  and to improve  the
quality of service.  It operates  the exclusive  rights  at  its  own risks,  finances  the  works,  the
equipment  and the other responsibilities  linked  to the execution of the concession  agreement
25without any use of the State credit or its guarantee.  It cannot claim any compensation  or help
from the  State.
The exclusive  rights can be exercised  on the extent of Ivoirian territory, its waters and
on  its  international  access  by  land,  sea  and  satellite  ways  according  to  the  international
treaties.  The  MTO  can provide,  in accordance  with the laws  and regulation  in  force  for the
competitive  sector,  any  telecommunication  service  open  to  competition.  The  concession
agreement  being  valid  for twenty  years,  three years  before  its  end,  CMte  d'Ivoire  Telecom
must inform the  State of its wish to ask  for the renewal.  Besides,  during the  first seven years
of  the  agreement  (until  2004),  it  will  provide  the  exclusive  services  granted  under  the
monopoly  regime,  in the  sense  that during  this period  (called  the  <<  monopoly  period  >>),  the
State will  abstain from  providing or granting  part or all  of the  exclusive  services  to  a  third
party.  This duration  takes  into account the period of several  years necessary  to improve  the
current operation of the MTO and  the important requirements  of public utility and of regional
development,  which have been imposed.  This duration cannot in any  case be renewed;  it may
even be shortened  if, with the  exception of aforce majeure, the grant holder is in one  of the
default cases6 provided  for the concession agreement.
Beside,  Coe d'Ivoire Telecom  is  due to pay to the  ATCI, in addition to the standard
firm tax paid to the State, a list of duties:
*  The  monthly  contribution  to  the  regulation  cost  - the  regulation
Contribution  - equal to 0.5% of the turnover of the exclusive rights;
*  A  monthly  contribution  for  financing  the  development  fund  of  rural
telephony  in  the  area  excluded  from  the  concession  agreement  - the
Telecommunications  Fund - equal  to  1%  of the  tumover of the exclusive
rights;
*  A  yearly  contribution  to  search  and  training  in  the  telecommunications
sector, equal to 0.5% of the turnover of the exclusive  rights;
*  A set of duties related  to the use of the radio  spectrum  (a start duty, some
taxes  for the  stations control,  some  operating commission  and the fees  for
the use of frequencies).
51n  the  light  of the  strategic  importance  of telecommunications  and  of the  monopoly  licensing  to a private
operator,  the  State has remained shareholder  in the new firm with  enough power to have a minority block.  It has
not succeeded  yet in  selling  14% to private Ivoirian  interests as planned.
6Among these  cases, the holders bankruptcy,  its liquidation, a delay or  non-execution  of the  works planned,  its
refusal to comply to the regulation bodies,...
26The regime of regulated  competition applies to cellular telephony,  the call boxes and to voice-
mail services.
The  three  current  mobile  operators  were  granted  some  authorizations  before  the
privatization  of C6te  d'Ivoire  Telecom;  Comstar  and  Telecel  in  March  1995  followed  by
Ivoiris  in October  19967.  Contrary to  the case of C6te  d'Ivoire  Telecom,  the granting to  the
mobile telephony  operators was not competitive,  even if they had to fulfill  some preliminary
conditions.  The  authorizations  were granted  by an administrative  decision  to the  three  main
companies  who  had  express  an  interest  in  this  service  provision  before  the  govemmental
decision  to open  the market.  This approach  was chosen since,  without any clear view  of the
demand or of the potential growth of the cellular market,  the govemment  did not consider  as
necessary  the  setting  up  of any  costly  auctions  on  the  radio  spectrum  or  an  invitation  to
tender. Nevertheless,  the operators  were only granted some temporary  (yearly)  authorizations,
submitted  to  one  restrictive  condition:  those  authorizations  could  only  become  permanent
8
after a careful  audit of their operations and networks by the ATCI .
There are several norms of cellular networks throughout the world. The existing one in
C6te d'Ivoire  is  GSM, used in several European  countries.  These networks  are connected  to
the telephone network operated  by C6te d'Ivoire Telecom.
The operators  of cellular  networks,  contrary to  the operator  of basic  services, benefit
from  the  freedom  to  set  their  prices,  the  freedom  of the  global  pricing  system,  and  the
freedom  of their marketing policy.  They also benefit  from a five-year tax exemption  starting
at the beginning of their activity.9
Moreover,  the direct access  to the intemational  telephone  service  through  the  cellular
operators is not currently authorized.  The State retains the right to modify this provision in the
future. If such modifications  were  to occur during the  Monopoly period, the State would take
some  measures  to compensate  the  MTO  in the  light of the rules of pricing control provided
for the concession agreement.
As  for  Cote d'Ivoire  Telecom,  the  mobile  operators  must pay  several  duties  to  the
legal  authority,  notably some  contributions for the use of the radio spectrum, for covering the
regulation cost of the sector, for research and training and for the financing the development
7 One must nevertheless  observe  that,  for administrative  reasons, those  firms started their  operations the last term
of 1996.
8 Some  operators  have  complained  about  this  situation  which  was  a  handicap  vis-a-vis  some  investors.
Nervertheless,  the audit is on its way and  all the  operators  have confidence  in the  imminent granting  of the  final
authorizations.
9 The  government  had  to give  these  facilities  in  order to  develop  the service  since  all  the market  studies  were
very pessimistic as regards its expansion  in Cote d'lvoire.
27fund of rural  telephony in the area excluded  from  the concession  agreement of C6te d'Ivoire
Telecom.
Whereas there is no fixed formal limit to the number of mobile operators  that could be
granted  a  license,  the  three  companies  have  been  already  granted  all  the  capacity  of  the
frequency  spectrum in the range of 900 Megahertz and the Government does not plan to grant
some other licenses for the mobile telephony.
The  operating  of  private  call  boxes  is  also  included  in  the  regime  of  regulated
competition.  Cote d'Ivoire  Telecom  is bound to connect in priority,  in the geographical  limits
and  service  delay set by the  specifications  of the concession,  and  to provide free of charge  a
priority service  of failure replacement  to  the authorized  operators  wishing  to  operate private
call  boxes.  In other  terms,  the  call box  operators  do not  create  any  telephone  lines but buy
some to C6te d'Ivoire Telecom  and sell them back.
The connection duty depends on the following conditions:
*  Presentation  by the operator of the authorization  granted by the ATCI or of
the receipt of its declaration to the ATCI as well of the approval  certificate
of its equipment,
*  Payment of the connection  costs and of a security computed  in the light of
the  fixed  rules  and  updated  at  regular  intervals  with  the  consent  of the
Telecommunications  Agency.
Cote d'Ivoire  Telecom has the ability to suspend the service of private  call boxes in the same
conditions  as for  any other  subscriber in case of non-payment  of the subscription,  rental and
traffic bills.
In this case also,  there is no fixed  formal  limit in the number of operators that could be
granted a license.  Up  to now, three  companies  have been granted  an authorization:  Publicom,
Camitel  and  Sogequip.  Although  its  activities  are  not prosperous,  Publicom  is the  only  one
who has been able  to set up some boxes (in Abidjan only).  The companies  of this sector can
hardly  face the competition  of their unique  provider, C6te  d'Ivoire Telecom.  The call  boxes
operators  must pay  the  same  fees  as the  mobile  operators.  They  complain  about that  since
they consider they pay the same fee twice for the same line.
The  regime of open competition,  in which the operators  do not need any authorization,
applies  to the  Internet  access  providers.  There  are  currently  three  operators  (Africa  Online,
Access  Telecom  and  Aviso)  and  the  number  of subscribers  remains  quite  low.  The  main
problem  for  thc  development  of  the  communication  medium  lies  in  the  high  prices  of
terminal equipments (the computers).
284-  THE RESULTS  OF THE REFORM
4.1-  The technical  results
Before  the  privatization  of  Cote  d'Ivoire  T6lecom,  there  was  a  real  shortage  of
telephone  exchanges.  For Abidjan,  only  four  telephone exchanges  were operating.  After the
privatization,  this  number has risen  significantly  on the national  territory,  even if it remains
insufficient.  For  Abidjan,  in  addition  to  the  four  telephone  exchanges  which  were  there
before,  two have been added,  namely Plateau  IV  (OCB  283  installed  in  1998)  and KM4-III
(OCB 283  installed in 1998)10.
For  Plateau  IV,  there  is  one  equipment,  at Adjame  (CSN-Plateau  IV),  brought  into
service in  1998. These two equipments have a total capacity of 9872,  a connected capacity  of
1235 and an average connecting rate of 6%.
As far as KM-Ill  is concerned,  there  are eight CSN-KM4  equipments  that have  been
installed  in  1998.  These  equipments  provide  a  total  capacity  of 22670  and  a  connected
capacity of  10552,  thus  an average  connecting  rate  of 46%.  Still  in  Abidjan,  the telephone
exchange  of  Banco  (OCB  283  installed  in  1997)  has  been  renewed.  In  addition  to  this
telephone  exchange,  seven  CSN  Banco  have  been  brought  into  service  for  an  occupied
capacity  of  39  104.  In July  1998,  the  total  connected  capacity  was  21  154,  so  an  average
connecting  rate of 54%.  These  improvements  have  increased  the  equipped  capacity  for  the
city  of Abidjan.  These  efforts are been extended to the  cities inside  the country where  some
new telephone exchanges of the last generation have been brought into service.
In  1997, the telephone exchange  of Bouake  (OCB 283)  has been brought into service
with  eleven  equipments  CSN-Bouake,  a  total  equipped  capacity  of  24  445  and  a  total
connected capacity  of 11  529, so  a connecting  rate of 47%.  The telephone  exchange  of San-
Pedro  (OCB  283)  was built in  1998.  Six  equipments  CSN-San Pedro with a total equipped
capacity  of 7048 and a connected  capacity of 3775 go with it.  The average  connecting rate is
53%.
0  The  information related to the telephone  exchanges comes from  Cote d'lvoire  Telecom.
29Teledensity
Table  10: Lines installed since the end of 1995
(end of the year)  Population  Number of fixed  lines  Teledensity  (for 100 in.)
1990  11 706  000  72 753  0.62
1991  12  178 000  81 284  0.67
1992  12 669 000  83 869  0.66
1993  13  180  000  90 165  0.68
1994  13 600 000  103 268  0.76
1995  14000000  115 790  0.83
1996  14 300 000  129 808  0.90
1997  14 700 000  142 322  0.97
1998  15  100 000  180  131  1.2
Source:  computations  made using the information obtained  from the ATCI  and Cl-Telecom.
The  data of Table  10 reveal  the large  increase in the number of fixed lines,  before  as
well as after the concession  granting. One must nevertheless  note that the increase during the
two  years preceding  the concession has been at least as large  as the  one achieved  during the
first year of the concession.
The data of Table  10 also show that there  has been a 39.4% increase  in the number  of
fixed  lines  during  the  first  two  years  of concession  operating  since  the  end  of 1996.  The
growth  rate  was especially  high  in  1998.  Figure  5  shows  that  this increase  had  a positive
impact on the teledensity.









1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
|  +-4--C6te  d'lvoire  -X-SSA
Source:  ITU
Tables  11,  12  and  Figure  5  show  the investment  distortion  between Abidjan  and the
rest of the country. The situation the concessionaire has inherited at the end of 1996 presented
a  high  degree of disparity  of telephone  equipment  rate between Abidjan  and the rest of the
country.  Since  then,  the  improvement  of teledensity  has been  proportionally  slightly  larger
30outside  Abidjan  (38%)  than  inside.  Nevertheless,  considering  the  large  initial disparity,  the
investment in the new line installation has not really restored the balance. In fact,  since  1996,
twice as many new lines have been installed in Abidjan than in the rest of the country.
Table  11:  Teledensity comparisons (Abidjan vs. the rest of the country)
End of  Abidjan  Rest of Cote d'Ivoire
Year
______  Population  |Fixed lines  Teledensity  Population  Fixed lines  Teledensity
1994  3 000 000  85  383  2.75  10 600 000  20 885  0.20
1995  3 100 000  88 000  2.84  10 900 000  27 790  0.25
1996  3 200 000  98 800  3.09  11 200 000  31  008  0.26
1997  3 200 000  105  000  3.28  11 500 000  37 322  0.32
1998  3 300 000  133  666  4.05  11 700 000  46 465  0.36
Source:  Computations made using the data provided by the ATCI and CI-Te1lcom
Table  12: Regional distribution of the teledensity before and after the reform
Abidjan  Bouake  S. Pedro  Yakro  Abeng  Korhogo  Man  Daloa
Before  2.34  0.57  0.33  0.32  0.25  0.25  0.24  0.20
refonm
(1995)
After  4.05  0.65  0.40  0.40  0.3  0.32  0.31  0.25
reform
(1 9 9 8  )  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Source:  Computations  made using the data provided by the ATCI, the INS and Cl-Telcom
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31If the teledensity measures represent  a useful benchmark,  they do not reflect perfectly
the access  to telecommunication  services  in the whole country.  Since some people  can have
several  lines,  the  percentage  of household  equipped  with  the  telephone  would  be  a  more
accurate measure.
The Call boxes
The  number  of call  boxes  is  another  important measure  of the  accessibility  for which  some
data are  available.  Before the reform and,  most of all, before privatization,  the call boxes rate
was  especially  low.  There  is  a  debate  as  regards  the  development  of call  boxes  since  the
concession granted to C6te d'Ivoire Telecom. This operator claims that 655  call boxes were  in
operation  at the end of 1998  whereas  ATCI  maintains  that they were  only  448.  Taking  into
account  the  178  call  boxes  operated  by Publicom,  it  suggests  that  a  minimum  of 626  call
boxes  were  in  operation  with  an  equipment  rate  of 0.04  for  1000  inhabitants.  Even if it
represents  a significant  improvement  compared  with the  situation  at the time  the concession
was  granted  (table  13),  the  level  is  still  very  low  in  comparison  with  the  international
references.
Table 13: Number of Call boxes
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
172  162  277  404  655
Source:  ATCI and Cl Telecom
Table 14:  network growth objectives  and achievements
Year  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001
Additional lines to build  35 000  45 000  60 000  70 000  80 000
(Objective:  Concession Agreement)
Results of additional lines  12 514  37 809
(Cote d'Ivoire Telecom)
Additional  call boxes  400  400  500  500  600
(Objective:  Concession Agreement)
Results of additional call boxes  105  251
(Cote d'Ivoire Telecom)
Source:  Concession Agreement and C6te d'Ivoire T61ecom
There  is indeed a real bettering of the situation.  The concessionaire  has  not achieved
its objectives  as regards the growth of the number of call boxes and, as  it has been noted,  the
call boxes operators had some problems to start their activities.  At the end of 1998, there were
32178 call  boxes brought into  service by Publicom, only one more than at the end of 1997  and
none  of them were  located  outside Abidjan.  The two  other authorized  operators  have not put
any  call box into service. Nevertheless,  there  is a growth in the number of private telecenters
(1922  at the end of 1998).  Those centers  notably improve the access  to the telephone in C6te
d'Ivoire.
Mobile telephony
The mobile telephone  market displays  an impressing  growth in Cote d'Ivoire since the
start of this service in October 1996,  as the above table shows.
Table  15: Evolution of the number of mobile  subscribers since  end of 1996
(end of the year)  Number of mobile  Population (millions)  Subscribers  for 100
subscribers  inhabitants
1996  8 000  14 300 000  0.056%
1997  35 723  14 700 000  0.25%
1998  71  064  15  100 000  0.47%
Source:  Telephony operators  and ATCI
The  above  data  do  not  take  into  account  an  important  element  conceming  the
development  of mobile telephone  use: the prepaid  telephone cards.  There is no connection  or
rental cost for this service that allows access  to the telephone for some people who could not
afford  a mobile  telephone.  Moreover,  these  cards  allow  the  users  to limit  their  use  and to
receive  the  calls  during a limited period after  the card  expired.  Because  of the  launching  of
this system at the end of August  1998, Ivoiris has attracted  about  17000 additional customers
and  Telecel  16000.  According  to  Telecel,  the  revenues  from  these  prepaid  cards  represent
about 80% of its turnover.
Including these customers would put the total number of mobile telephones  subscribers  up to
104 064 in  1998, which would  imply an equipment  density in mobile  telephones of 0.69 for
100 inhabitants (in  1998). Even without the inclusion of these prepaid cards users, the growth
of this part of the mobile telephone  sector is quite high, corresponding to the multiplication in
the number of subscribers by 4 between the end of 1996 and the end of 1998.  This impressive
result  in  a  context  of a  low  fixed  line  equipment  rate  suggests  that there  has  been  a high
degree of substitution between those two services in Cote d'Ivoire.
In terns of geographical  cover,  the mobile  telephone  services are mainly  available  at
Abidjan.  There  are  only  two  operators,  Telecel  and  Ivoiris,  who  have  some  subscribers
outside  Abidjan  (this represents  20%  of their subscribers).  One  must remark  that  12  cities
33outside Abidjan  (Abengourou,  Anyama,  Bingerville, Bouake,  Dabou, Daloa, Gagnoa,  Grang-
Bassam, Korhogo, San Pedro,  Soubr6 and Yamoussoukro) are now connected to the network.
Table  16 shows the evolution of the mobiles (see also Figure 7).
Table 16 :Cellular operators' technolog,  capacity,  and number of subscribers
1996  1997  1998
COMSTAR
Technology  GSM
Number of cell sites  4  4  4
Capacity  40 TRX  40 TRX  40 TRX
10 000  10 000  10 000
Number of subscribers  3500  6372  7980
IVOIRIS
Technology  GSM
Number of cell sites
Capacity
Number of subscribers  15045  28 084
Number of Prepaid  17 051
TELECEL
Technology  GSM
Number of cell sites  11  23  51
Capacity  45 TRX  103 TRX  257 TRX
Number of subscribers  14 311  35 000
Number of Prepaid  16 000
Source:  mobile telephone operators





Source:  The cellular operators (1998)
34Internet
The market for Intemet provision services remains relatively under-developed  in Cote
d'Ivoire.  The number of subscribers  is estimated  at 5000.  In  1998,  Africa Online  and Globe
Access had the highest number of subscribers.  Cote d'Ivoire Tel6com has just entered  (1999)
the market (Aviso) and is already  considered as a serious competitor.
Efficiency
This  section  presents  three  efficiency  indicators  for  the  fixed  lines  operator:  the
number of main lines per employee, the tumover per employee and the operating cost per line.
Table  17  shows  the evolution,  from  early  1997, of the number of main lines,  the number of
employees, of the tumover and of the ratios one can derive  from these numbers.
Table 17: Increase in the productivity since January 1997
Indicator  January  July  December  June  October  December
1997  1997  1997  1998  1998  1998
Number of lines  130 000  135  000  142 000  160 000  170 000  180  131
Tumover (in billions of francs  96  109  116  130  140  143
CFA)
Number of employees  3 328  3 275  3 243  3 164  3 150  3 035
Number  of  lines  per  39  41  44  51  54  59
employees  _
Tumover  per  employee  (in  29  33  35  41  44  47
billions of francs CFA)
Tumover per lines (in billions  740  808  806  815  824  793
of francs CFA)
Source:  C8te d'lvoire T1elcom
There  has  been  therefore  an  important  improvement  of  the  productivity  since  the
concession  was  granted.  Each  of the  efficiency  indicators  has  been  increasing  during  this
period,  with the exception of the turnover per line which first slowed down and then declined
at the  end of 1998,  due to  a higher  growth of the number of lines than that of the tumover.
The  number of lines per  employees  as  well as  the tumover per employee  has increased  by
more than 50% in less than two years.
35Figure 8: CI-Telecom:  Increase in the productivity since January 1997
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Source: taken from table 17.
The  operating  costs per line  have slightly decreased  during  the past three years.  This
decrease  has  been particularly  strong  since  the  concession  was  granted  as  it  can  be  seen
below:
Table  18: Operating Costs Reduction of CI-Telecom  since 1995
Indicators  1995  1996  1997  1998
Number of fixed lines  115 790  129 808  142 322  180  131
Operating  cost  per  year  (in  billions  of  61  186  63 423  47 000  51  542
francs CFA)  _
Operating cost per line (in francs CFA)  528 422  488 591  330 237  286  136
Source:  C6te d'lvoire Telecom
The  operating  cost  has  decreased  by  50%  during  the  past  three  years.  The  current
unitary cost is  286  131  francs CFA,  i.e. 477 US $. Thus,  the annual  operating  costs per line
are  getting closer  to  the average  cost of 380  US  $, according to the  computations  made by
ATCI on the basis on a  1995 data sample of 10 operators  from different regions  and countries
with  various  income  levels  (see  the  report  on the  world telecommunications  development,
ITU  1998).  Table  19  compares  the  situation  of C6te  d'Ivoire  with  the  situation of some
neighboring or similar countries.
36Table 19: International comparison  of performance indicators
Population  Number of  Teledensity  Turnover per  Number of
fixed lines  (for 100  line (US $)  employees for
inhabitants)  1000 lines
Cote d'Ivoire  14 700 000  142 322  0.97  1 343  17
Ghana  18  338 000  106 000  0.58  1 284  38
Cameroon (1996)  13  937 000  70 558  0.52  1 091  36
Senegal  8 762 000  116 000  1.32  1 148  86
Philippines  71  900 000  2 080 000  2.89  611  98
Bolivia  7 770 000  535 000  6.88  391  3.5
Source:  ITU
Quality / reliability
The  current  concession  agreement  of  CMte  d'Ivoire  Telecom  includes  a  set  of
improvement  objectives  for  the  quality  of  service.  The  concessionaire  must  attain  some
minimal norms  recommended  by the  ITU from the third year of the concession.  When these
objectives  are  attained,  the  performance  must  improve  again  to  attain  some  more  ambitious
objectives.  The  concessionaire  must  express  the  progress  made  each  year.  The  planned
objectives and the results attained are shown below:
Table 20: Quality and reliability indicators
Indicator  ITU  Objective  Result in July  1998
Percentage of delayed demands  for a main line  <5%  3%  26.8%  (=48.470
demands)
Waiting time for a connection  <60 days  30 days  348  days
Percentage  of failures  <3%  2%  9.24%
Percentage  of failures repaired in 48 hours  >80%  85%  51.66%
Percentage  of successful  local calls  >70%  85%  42%
Percentage of successful long-distance calls  >60%  80%  36%
Percentage of successful  international  calls  >60%  75%  34%
Percentage  of failures (call boxes)  <2%  1%  47%
Percentage  of failures repaired in 4 hours (call boxes)  >80%  90%  81%
Percentage of bills complaint  <1%  0.8%  3.57%
Source:  concession agreement / Cote dlvoire-Telecom
For several  domains,  the  quality of the service  is lower than  the  ITU  norms  and  the
concessionaire  will need to increase  its effort to attain the objectives  planned for the year 3.
Nevertheless,  a recent  survey of the ATCI has shown that 83% of the people believe that there
has been an improvement  in the quality of the  service whereas  75% feel  an improvement in
customers'  service.
37The  quality  of  service  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  has  also  been  compared  with  the  ones  in  the
neighboring  countries:  Ghana,  Nigeria,  Senegal  and Cameroon.  Figures  9 and  10  show  the
respective results of these countries as regards:
a) the ratio (in percentage) between the number of delayed demands and the number of
subscribers  to a fixed line,
b) the percentage of successful local calls.
Figure 9:  Ratio (in  %) between  the delayed  demands  and the number of
subscribers - West African Countries
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38Figure 10: Percentage of successful local calls - West African Countries.
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As  it  can  be  seen  on  the  above  figure,  the  Ivoirian  results  as  regards  the  delayed
demands  are  reasonably  good  compared  to  some  of its  neighbors.  On  the  other  hand,  its
results  on  the  rate  of  successful  local  calls  are  very  poor.  Whereas  Ghana,  Nigeria  and
Senegal are close to the ITU norms,  CMte d'Ivoire is still quite far.
4.2. Operating results
As we have mentioned before,  the bad operating results of Cote d'Ivoire  Telecom has
been  one of the  main  factors  that  led  to  the  decision  to  grant  a  concession  to  a  private
operator.
Financial results
The total turnover of COte d'Ivoire Telecom rose by 70% between  1995 (87 billions of FCFA)
and  1998  (142  billions  of FCFA).  The  net  result,  which  decreased  in  1996  and  1997,
increased  in  1998  to reach  4.3  billions  of FCFA.  The  bill  collection  rate  of the  private
customers  approaches  85%,  against  65%  before  the  privatization.  The  main  financial
performance  indicators of the company before and after the concession are presented  in Table
21.
39Table 21: Indicators of financial performance
(in millions of f CFA)  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Losses  and Profits
Tumover  62 429  95 223  85 229  136 954  142  762
Net result  - 4 848  4 562  350  1 050  4 324
Net result / Turn over  - 7.8%  4.79%  0.4%  0.77%  3.0%
Balance  sheet
Fixed assets  128  658  131 488  135 731  138 442  145  757
Working capital  63  158  71  676  62 363  79 695  N/A
Net worth  64 888  69 352  69 305  81  207  84 289
Long term Liabilities  40 349  56 007  48 211  57 698  58 313
Current Liabilities  86 579  77 805  80 578  79 232  N/A
Profitability  - 7.47%  6.58%  0.51%  1.29%  3.03
Debt ratio  38.34%  44.68%  41.03%  41.54%  40.89%
Bills  collection  Rate  (private  65%  81%
customers)
Source:  C6te d'lvoire-Telcom
The  main  financial  performance  indicators  of the other companies  of the  sectors,  in
particular the mobile  telephone operators and the call boxes operators,  are shown below:
Table 22:  Financial results of the mobile telephone  operators 1997-1998
Comstar  Ivoiris  Telicel
(in millions of  f CFA)  __l_l
Losses  and Profits
Tum over  2  600  2  300  7  500  17 000  7 584  16 500
Net result  -2 196  -707  473  6  000  - 123  2500
Net result / Tum over  - 95.4%  -30.7%  6.3%  35.2%  -0.02%  15.2%
Balance  sheet
Capital  2  300  2  300  4 136  4 136  2 865  2 865
Profitability of capital  - 95%  -31%  +11%  145%  -4%  87%
Source:  Mobile telephone  operators / ATCI
Whereas  the  1997  results  were  not really  favorable  (as  far as  Telecel  is  concemed,
they have reflected a provision of 200 millions of FCFA for the loss of use of its satellite),  the
1998  forecasts  for  two  operators  reveal  that  the  operating  margin  and  the  profitability  of
capital  are  very  impressive,  with  the  exception  of  Comstar  who  seems  to  face  some
difficulties  in expanding its market share.
40The other  operators of the  sector who  have not faced such a growth, such  as the  call
boxes  operators  and  the  Internet  providers,  have  suffered  from  various  unfavorable
evolutions.  The  losses of Publicom  have increased  since the  creation  of the  company three
years  ago  (with  a  loss  of 437  millions  of FCFA  in  1998)  whereas  Access  Telecom,  who
started its activities at the end of 1997, chalked up losses of 50 millions of FCFA last year.
Pricing policy
The  main  objectives  of the concessionaire's  pricing policy  are to provide  customers
with fair and competitive prices,  to give it some  reasonable expectations as regards the rate of
profit while inducing it to improve  its productivity  and  allowing to implement a progressive
set up of prices in relation  with the costs but also uniformly over the country.
The  connection  costs  have decreased  compared  with  the  time  when  C6te  d'Ivoire  T6lecom
was a public operator.  In  1990, the connection costs were  98  124 FCFA, i.e.  360 US $ and, in
th
1997, there were  only of 46 667 FCFA,  i.e.  65 US  $.1"  On March  28  , 1999, the connection
costs decreased  again by 7778 between  1997 and  1998, to reach 38  889. Expressed  in current
F CFA, the subscription costs have increased from 3860 (per month) in 1990 to 4244 in 1999.
Table 23 sums up the evolution of those prices.
This decrease in US $ is magnified by the CFA devaluation  which occurred  in 1994.
41Table 23: Evolution  of the telephone  price list of C6te d'Ivoire Telecom
Time  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Connection  98124  68820  68820  46660  46660  46660  46660  46660  46660  38 889
Monthly  3860  3860  3860  3860  3860  3860  3860  3867  3867  4244
subscription
Local Calls  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f/5mn
(< 60km )  /6mn  /6mn  /6mn  /6mn  /6mn  /6mn  /6mn  /6mn  /6mn
Long Distance
61 - 120 Km  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f
/30sec  /30sec  /30sec  /30sec  /30sec  /30sec  /30sec
121  - 270 Km  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f / 19.35 sec  64ff
/18sec  /18sec  /18sec  /18sec  /18sec  /18sec  /18sec  20.5 sec
> 270 Km  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f
/15sec  /15sec  /15sec  /i5sec  /15sec  /15sec  /15sec
International
**
UK  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f
(Peak hours)  /2.5sec  /2.5sec  /2.5 sec  /2.5sec  /2.5sec  /2.5 sec  /2.88sec  /2.88sec  /2.88sec  /2.88sec
USA  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f
(Peak hours)  /1.87s  /1.87s  /1.87s  /2.5s  /2.5s  /2.5s  /2.47s  12.47s  /2.47s  /2.47s
France  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f
(Peak hours)  /3.5s  /3.5s  /4.5 s  /4s  /4s  /4s  /3.46s  /3.46s  /3.46s  13.84s
Nigeria  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f  64f
(Peak hours)  /4.5s  /4.5s  /4.5s  /4.5s  /4.5s  /4.5s  /2.88s  /2.88s  /2.88s  /2.88s
Source:  C6te d'Ivoire Telecom
** In this case, the prices are set by area and by continent according  to 6-area classification.
AREA  PRICE
(ATI in CFA)
Area  1 (I 6.5 sec)  64
Area 2 (/ 3.48 sec)  64
Area 3 (/2.9 sec)  64
Area 1 (I 2.48 sec)  64
Area  1 (/1.74 sec)  64
Area  1 (/1.09 sec)  64
42The price modulation  system  is only at the beginning.  Indeed, the concession  agreement has
set up  a pricing  regime with four stages in the price control  during  the concession  duration.
These stages are:
- Steady prices until  September  1997,
- Until  September  1998,  the price  basket of C6te  d'Ivoire  Telecom must remain the
same  on  the  whole  as  the  preceding  one  in  nominal  value,  with  the  possibility  of
rebalancing  of some prices  against  some  others (in  any  case, the price of a particular
good of the basket shall not increased by more than  10% per year in nominal  value),
- From  September  30th,  1998,  to September  30'h,  2001,  the price cap  formula  shown
below will be applied to the basket:
Pn+,  = P.  x (1  - 7%)  x (l+inf)
With  P.+,  the new price cap to be applied  from October l"' of a given year to
September  30th the year after.
P.  the price cap to be applied for the year preceding Pn+l.
Inf  is the inflation rate equal to the change rate of the <<  African Worker >>
index published by the National Institute of Statistics.
- After the transition period (February 3rd,  1997  to September 30"',  2001), some prices
reevaluation will occur every 30 September  (the first time in 2001) taking into account
the  rate  of  return  of  the  capital  invested  by  C6te  d'Ivoire  Telecom,  the
telecommunication  prices  in the  neighboring  countries  and the  structural  pricing  in
force in Germany,  France, Great-Britain  and Italy.
Since some difficulties occurred in the enforcement of this pricing system because of a
lack of understanding  between  the  ATCI  and  C6te  d'Ivoire  Telecom,  the  second  stage was
extended until March 28th, 1999.
Initialization and implementation of the price cap system for Cl-Telecom
In principle,  the price cap  system  was supposed  to  start with the basket  provided  for
the concession  agreement  and  in  place  since  1990  (see  table  23).  Nevertheless,  before  the
privatization  process  reached  its  term,  the  previous  managing  team  slightly  changed  the
composition of the basket. The prices for long distance calls have been made uniform  (64 f /
19.35 sec) and the invoicing  is now monthly (instead of every two months). Since this change
43was more profitable (more than 50%  of the long distance  calls were between  61  and  120 km),
the  new managing team has kept it until the  first price  updating provided  for the  concession.
For this updating, the following procedure has been chosen.
Determination of the variation ratefor the price of  every  basket component.
Let X be the price of a given basket component.
X = (connection,  subscription,  local call, long distance call, intemational  call).
XI+ 1 is the new price to be applied from October  1st of a given year to
September  30 th the year after.
XI  is the price to be applied for the year preceding X.+1.
AX = Xn+l  Xn  100
Xn
The  AX found for each basket component must be less than or equal to 10%.
As  far  as local calls are  concemed,  there  have  been  some  divergences  between  the
method proposed by the regulators and the method proposed by the operator. According to the
former, the variation must be computed using as reference price the ratio of the standard price
(64f ATI) to the allowed duration (6 min).  In this case, we obtain XL=10.67  F and this is used
to compute  AX.  According  to the  operator,  this  variation  has  no bite  on its  tumover  since a
survey has shown that  81.6% of the local calls last for 1 to 3 minutes. Thus, for a  10% change
in its tumover (for this type of call),  it proposes rather a  fall in the communications  duration
from 64 f ATI /6 min to 64 f ATI / 3 min 18 sec.12
An agreement was finally found  in March  1999 and  the final price was set to 64 f  / 5
min.
For the long distance  calls, the  variation rate has been computed using the price for a
one-minute  call, i.e.,  XD=108 F.
For  the  international  calls,  it has  been  computed  using  the  average  price  of a  one-
minute call (the price for each area is included in this average  with a weight depending  on the
proportion of traffic  to this area).  Then, the reference  price, XI, can be found.
The following table provides the details of this computation.
12 This reflects the difficulty of price cap for non-linear pricing schemes.
44Table 24: Computation of the average  price for international calls
Distribution of the traffic according  to the area
Price NIT ( z;) / min  Traffic (Ti)  (min)  Weight of the traffic
(ti = Ti / T)
area 1  zi= 535  8 680 764  t1 21,6%
area 2  Z2=  995  15  571  982  t2=38,8%
area 3  Z3 = 1 200  6 262 231  t3 =15,6%
area 4  z4 = 1 392  6 040 017  t4 =15,0%
area 5  z5  = 2 047  3 114 263  t5 = 7,8%
area 6  z6 = 3 163  472 519  t6= 1,2%
Total  T = 40  141 776  100%
Weighted  average  (by  the  traffic)  of  the  international  call  price  per
minute.
XI= Et,z = 1 094 F
Determination of the variation rate of the unitary basket
From the price cap formula provided for the concession  agreement,
Pn+, = P.  x (1 - 7%) x (1+inf),
it is possible  to find the targeted basket variation rate to reach,
A  Ptarget = (1 - 7%) x (1+inf) -1.
Moreover, the weight of each component of the basket is equal  to the proportion of the
takes  it represents  in the  total  takes of the  basket.  Thus,  the  following  weights have  been
applied:
Table 25: Determination  of the basket component weights
Basket component  Takes (Tk)  Weight in the basket
(Wk=  Tk /T)
Connection  Tc  Wc=  Tc /T
Monthly subscription  Ts  Ws= Ts fT
Local calls  TL  WL= TL fT
Long distance calls  TD  WD= TD /T
International  calls  T,  WI= T, /T
Total  Basket total takes (T)  100%
45Then the impact on the basket of any price change  is computed as follows:
ALPimpact  =  E  WkAXk
where  Wk = (Wc,  WS,  WL,  WD, W 1)  and  Xk =  (Xc,  XS,  XL, XD,  Xl).
At last, one must compareAPimpact  with  APtarget  and the  former should be equal
or greater than the latter. The table below shows how the price updating is performed.
Target variation rate of  the basket
Formula to use: APtarget  = (1 - 7%)(1 + inf) -1
For  an  inflation  rate  equal  to  4  %,  APtarget=  -3.28%,  so  the  basket  price  must
decrease  by at least 3.28 %.
Impact of the variations on the basket
Table 26: Impact of the price variations on the basket
Basket  Weight in  Variations  Wk*  AXk
component  the basket  Axk
Wk
Connection  1%  - 14.3 %  -0.1%
Subscription  6%  9.9 %  0.6%
Local  17%  10,0%  1.7%
Long distance  35%  -5.9%  -2.1%
International  41%  -10%  -4.1%
Total  100%  AP  m"'  = 4%
There  is  a -4% change  in the basket  prices, which  is equivalent to  a 4% drop in  the
basket.  In this example,  the effective  fall (4 %) is higher  than the required  fall (3.28%).  The
results therefore comply with the criterion on the basket variation.
46Mobile phone prices
The mobile operators  are free to set their prices as they wish. The price list of the three
operators is shown in following table. It remained stable during the period  1997-1998.
Because of the important differences in the cost of living between countries and of the
difference in the government policies (for example,  the subsidies granted to some users), it is
difficult to compare  the prices of telephone  services  across countries.  Nevertheless,  we  have
tried  to  provide  some  comparison  elements  by  showing  in  the  tables  the  figures  for  the
standard services  and  for the mobile telephone  of Cote d'Ivoire,  of its neighbors  and of some
countries from Latin America or Asia.
Table 27: Telecommunication  price list in Cote d'Ivoire and some similar countries
(in $ US)  Cote  Burkina  Ghana*  Senegal  Philippines  Bolivia
d'Ivoire  Faso
Fixed Service
Connection cost  73.7  37.9  28.7  41.1  13-16  168
Monthly  subscription  6.1  3.7  2.0  4.9-11.9  10.1-23.1  2.0
(minim.)
Local  call  (3  minutes  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  N/A  0.01
maximum)  I
Average  call to the US  2.4  2.5  2.3  1.5  2.07  1.01
(per minute).
Mobile  service
Connection cost  61.4-66.3  88  100  64.7  57  9.3
Monthly  subscription  21.1-26.3  17.5  N/A  17  4.5  15.0
(minimum)
Local call (1 minute)  0.3-0.7  0.3  N/A  0.2-0.4  0.91  0.51
Source: Data from the operators and the ITU. Those of the Senegal are for  1998. * Approximations  in 1997
Even  it is hard  to  estimate  its magnitude,  there exists a large  unsatisfied  demand in
C6te d'Ivoire, which justifies some important investments  in the sector. But it is hard to assess
precisely the level of the future demand because of the transfers that seem to happen from the
fixed services to the mobiles.
474.3-  The regulation  bodies and their difficulties
The regulation  bodies  in the  telecommunications  sectors  as  they exist do not have  a
very  long history.  Nevertheless,  after, four years  of existence,  it  is possible  to analyze  their
activities and the problems they  have faced in the resolution of conflicts.  The current structure
of the sector provides  for two levels of intervention.
The  Telecommunications  Ministry,  through  the  Office  of  Policy  and  Intemational
Affairs  for  Post  and  Telecommunications  (DPAI  - PT),  is  commissioned  to  design  the
regulation.
Two regulatory bodies, the ATCI and the CTCI, are in charge  respectively of ensuring
that  the  regulation  is  applied  and  supervising  the way  it  is  applied.  These  structures  are
favorable  to  the  harmonious  development  of the  sector.  Nevertheless,  some  inefficiencies
have been observed  as regards the exercising of the respective responsibilities.
As  for the Ministry,  although essential  to the new telecommunications  landscape,  the
DPAI  - PT  has  not been  able  to  fulfill  its mission.  So,  after  its  two  assistant  directors,  its
director and many others agents left successively,  the structure has been emptied of its human
substance  and has  not  able  to  exert  any  influence.  From  this,  its  activities  are  now  often
exercised by the ATCI. Indeed, the telecommunications  code (the Law)  lacks precision on the
implementation  of the supervisory  Ministry  function. Indeed,  this code does not say anything
on how the DPAI-PT should fulfill its missions.
Within its  current regulatory  framework,  the  spirit of the  law  gives  to  the ATCI  the
responsibility  of regulation  at the  first stage and to the CTCI the arbitration and conciliation
role if the operators  are  unhappy  with the decisions  taken by  the ATCI.  Nevertheless  in its
letter,  notably  the stipulation  of the  Telecommunications  code,  the concession  agreement  of
C6te d'Ivoire Telecom and of the other legal texts, it appears in many aspects confusion in the
interpretation  of the powers and responsibilities of the ATCI and of CTCI'3.
The  essential  question  concems  the  status  of  the  CTCI:  should  it  be  considered  as  a
conciliation  authority  or as a quasi-judiciary  authority  whose decisions are compulsory?  The
CTCI has not been put into question  so far, but there  is a risk that its role in the resolution of
conflicts  be  contested  in the  near  future  if there  is  no legal  clarification  of its  role  and  its
proper authority.  Nevertheless,  the CTCI is not the last resort for the  operators  since they can
13 This overlapping  of functions  is probably the consequence  of the late  decision to create  two regulatory bodies.
Originally,  the project  did not include  article  51  creating the ATCI,  but only the  50th concerning  the  CTCI  (with
the same three  responsibilities).
48take  the matters to  court in case  of failure of the arbitration  and conciliation of the  CTCI'4.
Nevertheless,  this resort,  although it ensures  the fairness  of the decisions,  if it is too  easy  to
exercise or if it applies to daily regulation,  could harm the regulatory process  and increase  its
costs and delays.  Therefore,  it is very important  that the  law not  only clarifies  the role  and
attributions of the ATCI and the CTCI, but also makes clear the qualification of the orders of
the CTCI as well as their seniority  compared  to those of the ATCI in the conflict resolution
area. 15
The  ignorance  of the  texts  and  laws  in  force  in the  telecommunications  industry
displayed by the economic  agents and the public is another major problem of this sector, it is
strong handicap  for the public accountability.  For example, the  absence  of publication  of the
concession  agreement  of  C6te  d'Ivoire  Telecom  prevents  the  other  operators  and  the
consumers  from exercising their rights towards this concessionaire  which operates at the same
time all the basic services  (fixed telephone  and telex services).
As  far as  the  supervision  mechanisms  used  by the regulatory  bodies  are concerned,
they are all in all in conformity with those used all around the world. Indeed, the pricing rules
are  of price-cap  nature  with  some  additional  norms  for  the  quality  of the  service  and  the
performance  of the network close to the ones defined by the International  Telecommunication
Union  (ITU).  However,  the  updating  delay  of the  price  cap  remains  too  short  (three  years
against five years in general); this can hamper the operator's incentives to increase efficiency.
The  CTCI  has settled  several  conflicts  between  the  operators  and  the  ATCI.  In several
cases, the CTCI has turned to be a strong defender of the rights of the operators.  For example,
in  a conflict  between  CBte  d'Ivoire  Telecom  and  the ATCI  on  the procedure  of choice  of
subcontracting  firms, the operator had been sentenced to a fine of 20 millions of FCFA by the
regulators. The CTCI denounced the illegality of the fine and the operator was reimbursed.
4.4-  Competition policy and the conflicts between  operators
When  the  telecommunications  market  has been  opened to  competition,  there  was  a
debate  on  whether  the  authorization  granting  operation  to  operators  under  regulated
competition  should be made before or after the concession of the basic services.  Finally,  the
authorizations were given before the privatization.  This step has fostered a rapid growth of the
mobile  telephone  market  but  has  led  to  some  contradictions  between  the  concession
14 For C6te d'Ivoire  Telecom,  the  concession agreement  stipulates  in its  26'  article that the last resort after the
CTCI is the International  Chamber of Commerce  of Marseille  in France.
15  As of February 2001, no clarification  of the respective roles for the ATCI and the CTCI has been made.
49agreement  and the Law and then defacto with some denials  of the authorizations  given to the
mobiles operators.
Indeed,  whereas  there  is no  stipulation  of the  Law  forbidding  a direct  intemational
access  for the mobiles operators,  the article 4.216 of the concession agreement forbids them to
do so.  But before  the contract  was signed,  one of the mobiles  operators  (Telecel  de  Loteny)
had  already  acquired  its infrastructures  - a  land station  for  satellites  of 200  millions  of F
FCA-  and  was  operating  some  international  calls.  Its  authorization  was  totally  withdrawn
(decision n° 96699 of November  28th,  1996, of the Ministry for economic infrastructures).
The  concession  has  also  led  to  a  renegotiation  of the  interconnection  agreements
signed  before  privatization  and  the concessionaire  has  put into  question  the  authorization
given to Publicom.
Since the liberalization  of the markets,  several conflicts occurred between the actors of
the sector.  According  to the Telecommunications  Code (Article  4),  the government must see
that the conditions  for a fair and open competition are satisfied each time entry is not limited
to  one  operator  but  it  is  not  specified  which  institution  should  exercise  this  function.
Paradoxically,  it is in  the concession  agreement  (Article  36.2.1)  that this role  is allocated  to
the  ACTI.  However,  both  the  ATCI  and  the  CTCI have been  implied  in the  settlement  of
conflicts.  Here  again,  the  procedure  has  been  first  to  turn  to  the Agency  and  then  to  the
Council.
The authorization  of Publicom was the first conflict between  operators  for which the
regulators  intervened.  Considering  that the  terminal  equipment  of the  call  boxes  was  fixed,
Cote  d'Ivoire  Telecom  claimed  that  this  service  was  also  part  of  its  exclusive  rights.
Dismissed  by the  ATCI,  the  concessionaire  tried  to  stifle Publicom  by resorting  to  unfair
pricing.  Whereas  the access  price paid  to him by  Publicom  was of 65  f /impulse  (IAT), the
same  impulse  was  of 73f  in  its  own  call  boxes.  The  margin  of 8f/impulse  given  to  the
competitors  was too low for them to cover their cost.  The regulators intervened on August  8'h,
1998,  to  set  a  minimum  price  of  85f/impulse  in  the  call  boxes.  In  spite  of  all  these
interventions,  the  operators  of the sector are not out of troubles since  C6te  d'Ivoire Telecom
has kept on excluding them by line denials.
Whereas  many  steps  have been taken to  settle  the  conflicts  between  operators,  some
problems remain unsolved.
16 This  article  was  in  fact  added  to the  initial  version  of the  concession  agreement  under  the  pressure  of the
buyers  on  the  one  hand  because  of the  bad  state  of the  infrastructure  and  of the  fact  that  the  international
50First, do the regulators  manage to enforce  their decisions  by the operators?  Indeed,  in
the  call boxes  conflict,  the ATCI  took some  decisions,  in particular by  setting a minimum
price.  But,  up  to  December  1998,  Cote  d'Ivoire  Telecom  had  not  put  this  measure  into
practice.
Then,  it is  necessary  to  clarify  the  question of the  intervention  of the  CTCI in the
conflicts  between  operators.  According  to the clauses  of the  Law,  its  role is  limited  to the
conflicts  between  the Civil  Service  (ATCI)  and the  operators.  In  principle,  the  competition
commission created  by the  Law  91-999  of December  27th,  1991  should manage  the  topics
linked  with  competition.  This  commission  can  issue  some  notices  for  the  settlements  of
conflicts  about  cartels,  abuse  of  dominant  position,  the  increase  in  the  market  power,
predatory  pricing  or any  other  event  creating  and  reinforcing  a  dominant position.  But  in
practice,  the  small  influence  of  this  commission  added  to  the  general  approach  of  the
regulation of the sector in C6te d'Ivoire - i.e. using specific laws and institutions to solve  the
problems - have resulted in almost all the competition disputes being settled by the regulatory
bodies.
Finally,  like  the  conflicts  between  operators,  the  Law  does  not  provide  for  the
intervention  of the  CTCI in the  conflicts  between  operators  and consumers.  This  is  all the
more worrying that most consumers  do not know their rights towards the  operators and that
the UCOCI (Consumers Union of C6te d'Ivoire),  in charge of representing them,  has not the
means  to  implement  its  policy.  This  situation  is  all  the  more  exacerbated  by  the  lack  of
publication of the concession agreement of C6te d'Ivoire Telecom and the freedom of setting
the prices  given to  the mobile operators.  Thus  rationed  on the  fixed telephone  (the  average
connecting  delay  is  of about 348  days),  the  consumers  are  turning  to  the mobile  telephone
which is overpriced (the prepaid cards are one of the examples). Indeed, the mobile operators,
aware of this rationing, are making an implicit cartel on the prices  rather than waging  a price
war.
Meanwhile,  the  CTCI  often consults  the UCOCI  and  the  ATCI and makes  its  own
survey to appraise the degree of consumers'  satisfaction. Consumers are not represented  in the
regulatory institutions but participation in some national projects such as the move from 6 to 8
numbers for telephone identification.
represented  60% of the revenues  of Cl -TELCOM  before the privatization  and on the other hand competition  on
this part of the market could be suicidal  for the concession holder.
514.5-  Interconnection
The reality  of the competition  induced by the liberalization  relies on the quality of the
interconnection agreements.
CI-Telecom is a vertically integrated firm that is the only one to provide local and long
distance fixed telephony.  The only interconnection problem is therefore with the other mobile
operators.
There  is an interconnection  agreement  between  CI-Telecom  and the  other authorized
cellular  operators.  This  agreement,  originally  signed  between  CI-Telecom  and  Comstar
Cellular,  has been extended to the other  operators.  The agreement  includes a commitment to
realize the networks interconnection and to maintain it "wisely".
Since CI-Telcom  is responsible  for the telephone  directory,  the mobile  operator  can
include their own subscribers in this book provided they pay the publishing costs.
Come  into  force  on  September  9h,  1997,  the  agreement  can  be  revised  by  mutual
agreement  (after  3 months)  or terminated  with  a  24 months'  notice  or  in case  either  of a
refusal  to comply to the duties or of bankruptcy.
Any  dispute  lasting  for  more  than  30  days  concerning  the  enforcement  of  the
agreement  will be referred to the arbitration of the Telecommunication Council  and in case of
absence of conciliation to the Court of Abidjan.
The  interconnection  nodes  are  provided  for  the  agreement,  namely  the  numerical
exchanges  with  autonomous  delivery  with  the  CCITT  n°7  ISUP  signaling.  The  Cocody
exchange  is the only one having these features.
The  interconnection  costs  are  divided  between  fixed  and  variable  costs.  The  fixed
costs  include  mainly the  costs of technical  building and land renting; the cost of pylons and
connection  renting are  mainly  determined  as  a function  of the  current  economic  conditions.
The objective  is to cover the real costs.
As  far  as  the  connection  links  are  concemed  (and  since  CI-Telcom  also  uses  these
lines for its own use), the fixed costs are divided by 2.  The way these costs are set seems to be
a sort of cost-plus system with a margin of 30% (inclusive of all the overheads).
The pricing  of the  communication  delivery  is based  on the  idea  that it should  be as
close  as  possible  to  the  costs  of  Cl-Telecom  (taking  also  into  account  some  reasonable
margins compared with the international  competition).
The prices are  10 F (NIT)  / min for local (0 to 60 kin)
180 F (NTI) / min for long distance
52excluding  the  subscription costs  representing  on average  15%  of the  bill.  Nevertheless,  the
prices are not balanced and the local prices are below the costs.
If one leaves aside the cover for outstanding payments fixed by the cellular operator,
the access prices for a call from a mobile to a fixed network are:
aL = 25 F  for a local call
aD = 130 F  for a long distance call
The agreement also stipulates the prices paid to CI-Telecom by its subscribers  calling
a cellular subscriber:
PL = 25 F + bL for a local call
PD = 130 F + bD  for a long distance call
where bL (resp. bD) is the access price fixed by the cellular operator.
The way  the prices aL  and aD have been chosen  is not specified  but for the  fact that
they are supposed to be closer to the costs than the internal prices chosen by Cl-Telecom  for
its subscribers.
The establishing  of the CI-Telcom prices  to the  cellular is interesting.  Indeed,  if one
assumes that the competition in the mobile sector will lead to prices (bL, bD) close to marginal
costs, the prices (aL,  aD) appear to be determined  by the ECPR  (Efficient Component Pricing
Rule) logic
25 =pL-bL
130 = pD - bD
following the idea of the opportunity cost of loosing a customer.
If CI-Telcom  (or its subsidiary) loses a cellular customer, it loses the income PL (or PD)
minus the spare cost bL (or  bD).
Alternatively,  if one  starts by the prices  set by  CI-Telcom  for  its customers  to the  cellular
customers:
PL = 25 F + bL
PD= 130 F+bD
the access prices are established  following the ECPR:
aL =  PL - bL
aD =  PD - bD.
53It is a way to construct the ECPR access prices before any rebalancing if one considers
that  PL,  PD  are  chosen  by  the  regulator.  At last,  one  must  remark  that  the  access  prices
between  mobile  operators are  set equal  to zero  (the bill and keep doctrine) but the operators
must pay some interconnection charges of 25 F to Cl-Telecom.
Nevertheless,  it is unlikely  that  the  competition  will  influence  the  access  charges  of
Cl-Telecom  to the mobile phones. Indeed,  even if the mobile  operators  compete  in the price
proposed for the calls to Cl-Telecom  and to the other mobiles,  it is in their interest,  as long as
Cl-Telecom  remains a monopoly, to charge the monopoly  access prices for the calls from CI-
Telecom to the mobiles.
It is the lack of regulation that explains  the high profits made by the mobile operators.
It  is therefore  urgent to regulate the access  prices (since a real competition  on the fixed lines
cannot be expected shortly) either by setting some price cap or by integrating in the price cap
of  Cl-Telecom  the  price  of the  calls  to  mobile  phones.  It  would  give  CI-Telecom  some
incentives  to  negotiate  lower  access  prices.  Nevertheless,  since  there  is  no  freedom  of
choosing its own access price, these incentives are unlikely to be sufficient to succeed.
5 - PROSPECTS OF ENTRY OF NEW OPERATORS
Apparently,  there are four domains  for the involvement  of some new private actors in
the sector. As it has been said, a development  funds for rural telephony has been created by a
ministerial decree.  It is mainly  financed by the contribution of the operators  completed by the
help  of the  State.  This  fund  is  managed  by a  board  composed  of representatives  of the
supervisory  ministries,  of  the  BNETD,  of the  CAA  and  of  the  regulatory  authority.  A
technical  committee  that consists of some representatives  of C6te d'Ivoire Telecom  can give
him some  advice.
The necessary investments for the fixed lines and the mobile telephone have been estimated to
257 billions  of FCFA  (450 millions of $ US).  The  allocation of the  figures  is  shown  in the
table below:
54Table 28: Investments realized  and scheduled  (millions  of FCFA)
Investment  1998  1997  1996  Total  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total
Fixed Lines  39,553  31,700  28,482  99,735  60,000  55,000  50,000  40,000  205,000
Mobiles  12,638  15,821  5,146  33,605  20,000  12,000  10,000  10,000  52,000
Call boxes  N/A  300  700  700  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Internet  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A
Total
Investment  52,191  47,821  34,328  134,340  80,000  67,000  60,000  50,000  257,000
Source:  telecommunication  operators
The  end of the period of statutory monopoly of CMte d'lvoire Telecom will enable new
fixed  lines  operators  to  enter  the  market  which  could  be  centered  at  first  in  the  business
district.
There are two other possibilities for the involvement of private actors in the mobile telephone:
- The  concession  agreement  allows  the  govemment  to  grant  to  mobile  telephone
operators  the  possibility  to  use  their  own  infrastructure  for  international  communications.
Since one of the operators has already  such an infrastructure  (which is currently used  for the
data  transmission  only),  the  government  could  exercise  this  option  before  the  end  of the
statutory  monopoly  of  CMte  d'Ivoire  Telecom  in  order  to  lower  the  cost  of long-distance
services in Cote d'Ivoire.
- When the new capacity of the radio spectrum  will be available,  it will be possible to
give  to  some new  operators  the  right to  enter the mobile telephone  market  by allocating  the
frequencies in the context of a competitive procedure  and maybe to create  a secondary market
on the frequencies permits.
Besides, for the Internet services and the E-Business, the low level of activity suggests
that there is space for additional  investments.  But the future prospects  could be  dependent on
a change in the tax system (reduction of the import duties on the computer equipment).
55CONCLUSION
It  is  too  soon  to  evaluate  the  validity  of  the  approach  granting  monopoly  to  CI-
Telecom.  Concerning performance, one must stress that after a difficult first year, Cl-Telecom
has  met the objectives of the  concession contracts  for main lines and call boxes in  1999  and
2000.  Objectives  conceming  rural  telephony  and  quality  of  service  have  not  been  met.
Penalties  have  been assessed  by  the  ACTI but not  enforced.  CI-Telecom  has  been able  to
argue  that  the  public  administrations  have  not  paid  their  bills.  Tariffs  have  been  slightly
rebalanced twice (see Table 29 in FCFA).
Table 29: Fixed Line Tariffs in Cote d'Ivoire
Before March 18,  1999  From March  18,  1999  From
(VAT  11,11 %)  (VAT  11,11 %)  December 2,2000
(VAT 20 %)
Connection  42000  35000  35000
Subscription  3400  3820  4200
Local  58/6 mn  58/5 mn  58/4 mn
Interurban  180/mn  150/ mn  160/ mn
Intemational  535-3200  535-3200  537-2000
The revision of the price is under way to occur starting October 2001.
To conclude,  one  can say that the  regulatory  institutions carefully put in place before
privatization  are  functioning  reasonably  well  (much  better  than  competition  policy  for
example)  for an African country.  Unfortunately  the political  events which have happened  in
the last two years  will garble considerably the  experiment of C6te  d'Ivoire.  It will be difficult
to assess the "monopoly experience"  for comparison with other policies.
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